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Cost Benefit Analysis  Cost Benefit Analysis attempts to quantify in monetary terms 
the value of as many of the consequences of employment and 
training programmes as possible to determine whether their 
benefits outweigh their costs.
Cost Benefit Framework Cost Benefit Framework specifies how the Department for 
Work and Pensions’ cost benefit analyses should be conducted 
and reported.
Cost-effectiveness Cost-effectiveness pertains to programme costs and benefits 
relative to other programmes.
Displacement effects Displacement effects occur if a firm expands at the expense 
of other firms because its employment costs are subsidised by 
the Government.
Employment and training  Employment and training programmes provide services 
programmes (e.g. job search, training, and subsidise jobs) to non-workers on 
 benefits to help them move into paid employment.
Entry and deterrent effects Entry effects occur where a programme is perceived as 
beneficial, but is available only to benefit recipients, and some 
persons may take up benefits in order to qualify. Deterrent 
effects can occur in the case of mandatory programmes for 
benefit recipients, some individuals who might otherwise have 
taken up benefits may decide not to do so in order to avoid the 
‘hassle’ of participating in the programme. 
Equilibrium wage effects Equilibrium wage effects can theoretically occur when those 
in an employment and training programme search harder for 
jobs or their job skills increase and, as a result, their weeks 
or hours are greater than they otherwise would have been, 
then the resulting increase in labour supply will tend to put 
downward pressure on the equilibrium wage within the 
labour markets in which they work. If the programme tends 
to reduce job vacancies – for example, by making job search 
more efficient or imparting job skills that are in demand – this 
will also increase downward wage pressures. Thus, workers 
who are employed in the same labour markets as programme 
participants could receive lower wages than otherwise would 
be the case. Notice that if wage rates are lower than they 
would be without a programme, then this will tend to mitigate 
substitution effects resulting from the programme.
Glossary of terms
xiiiGlossary of terms
Fiscal substitution effects Fiscal substitution effects can occur for ‘wage subsidy 
programmes’ that pay subsidies to private sector employers 
that hire members of specific disadvantaged target groups or 
for ‘public sector employment’ programmes that directly place 
targeted disadvantaged individuals into jobs at government 
agencies or non-profit institutions. In this case, the targeted 
workers may be hired instead of, or even replace, those who 
are not targeted and, hence, are more expensive to employ.
General equilibrium effects General equilibrium effects are those where employment and 
training programmes may have effects on the well-being of 
those who are not enrolled in the programme and, because 
of this, on well-being of the economy. Such effects include 
substitution effects, displacement effects, equilibrium wage 
effects, multiplier effects, and entry effects.
Incapacity benefits Incapacity benefits are cash benefits available to disabled 
persons who are not working or who are working only a few 
hours a week.
Impacts Impacts are programme effects (e.g. on employment and 
benefit receipts) on programme participants. 
Income Support Income Support is a non-contributory, income-assessed 
benefit available to people who are not required to work.
Jobseeker’s Allowance Jobseeker’s Allowance provides cash benefits to the 
unemployed.
Micro-simulation model Micro-simulation models use data on individuals (i.e. micro-
data) to predict how changes in government programmes 
will affect individuals and what the changes will cost the 
government.
Multiplier Multiplier is a value greater than one that is used to adjust 
estimates of expenditures if it is expected that they generate 
benefits to the economy that exceed their immediate value. 
New Deal for Disabled People New Deal for Disabled People is a voluntary programme that 
provides counselling and services through Job Brokers to help 
the disabled enter employment.
New Deal for Lone Parents New Deal for Lone Parents is a voluntary programme that 
provides counselling and services through Jobcentre Plus to 
help unemployed lone parents enter employment.
New Deal for Partners New Deal for Partners offers advisory support to partners of 
claimants of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)/Incapacity Benefit/
Income Support/Severe Disablement Allowance/Carer’s 
Allowance. 
ND25+ New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus is a mandatory 
programme for longer term JSA claimants (over 18 months) 
who are aged over 25 years.
xiv
ND50+ New Deal for individuals aged 50 plus is a voluntary 
programme with specialist advice for those aged over  
50 years.
Net benefits Net benefits are the benefits of a programme less the costs of 
the programme.
Quantiles  In this context, quantiles are subgroupings – points taken 
at regular intervals from the distribution of a continuous 
outcome variable, such as the earnings distribution. 
Sensitivity tests Sensitivity tests are used to determine how estimates of 
benefits and cost change when the assumptions on which 
they are based are changed.
Substitution effects Substitution effects occur if participants in a programme take 





This report was produced with the primary aim of informing cost benefit estimates within the 
Cost-Benefit Framework (CBF). The Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) CBF is a guidance 
document for the production of cost-benefit information. The research consisted of two components 
– a literature review and new empirical estimates from DWP administrative data. 
General equilibrium in cost benefit analyses
This report reviews what is known about general equilibrium effects and discusses when they are 
likely to be important. We also present estimates and recommendations to account for these effects 
in cost benefit analyses (CBAs). These estimates can be used to guide sensitivity tests. 
The key conclusions about treating general equilibrium effects in conducting CBAs of employment 
and training programmes are:
•	 base-case	estimates	should	first	be	derived	by	assuming	no	general	equilibrium	effects;
•	 for	substitution	effects,	in	conducting	sensitivity	analyses	of	demand-side	employment	and	
training programmes that subsidise employers for employing certain categories of disadvantaged 
workers or place such workers directly into jobs, 60 per cent can reasonably be used as the 
upper bound value of the short-run substitution effect and 30 per cent as the lower bound value. 
However, in reporting the sensitivity results, it should be emphasised that findings from the survey 
approach imply that they are considerably smaller. It should be emphasised that even if as large 
as 60 per cent if the economy is growing, then these substitution effects would be expected to 
diminish over time. However, for supply-side programmes of job search assistance, training, and 
financial incentives that encourage or help individuals to seek or enter employment, use ten or 
20 per cent as the upper bound and zero as the lower bound. For both, a caution should be added 
about the existence of substitution effects by briefly reviewing the evidence presented in Tables 
2.2	and	2.3	of	this	report;
•	 for	equilibrium	wage	effects,	sensitivity	tests	of	the	base-case	for	large-scale demand-side 
programmes might be conducted by assuming that there is a small increase in wages of one 
or two per cent. Similar sensitivity tests for supply-side programmes do not seem appropriate 
because	the	evidence	concerning	these	effects	is	too	weak;
•	 for	entry	effects,	the	likely	direction	and	importance	of	these	effects	should	be	discussed	in	
reporting cost-benefit findings of employment and training programmes.
Subgroup impacts and the distribution of impacts




programme may vary for different subgroupings of that variable.







•	 subgroups	should	be	defined	on	the	basis	of	status prior to programme entry;
•	 it	is	important	to	test	whether	programme	impacts	on	different	subgroups	differ	statistically	from	
one another (for example, a t-test of the statistical significance of the difference between the 
subgroup impact sizes), not just whether the individual impacts are statistically significant (for 
example,	a	t-test	of	the	statistical	significance	of	the	impact	from	zero);
•	 where	subgroup	impacts	are	produced	and	found,	it	is	important	to	explore	the	delivery	of	services	






Specifically for quantile subgroup impacts of the continuous outcomes like earnings or duration of 
employment or benefit claim:
•	 in	general,	the	target	of	the	programme	needs	to	be	carefully	considered	and	the	quantile	
treatment effects are most needed where a particular part of an outcome distribution (of 
earnings or benefit duration) may be the desired target. This is relevant where one might  
consider	targeting/limiting	programme	access	to	a	particular	group	in	the	future;
•	 quantile	impacts	might	be	most	successfully	estimated	for	programmes	where	participation	has	
been randomly assigned. 
Duration of benefits and employment, and wages 





Chapter 5 and Appendix A show the estimates of the above variables for New Deal programmes. 




out when a comparison group can be constructed.
•	 All	evaluations	should	be	required	to	provide	information	about	the	data	processing	rules	applied	
for overlapping or inconsistent information as these rules can affect the measured impact values. 
•	 Ideally,	there	should	be	an	agreed	standardised	set	of	basic	data	processing	rules	for	overlapping	
and inconsistent information in the DWP employment and benefits administrative data. 
•	 While	descriptive	evidence	on	gross	outcomes	from	the	National	Benefits	Database,	such	as	
those estimated here can improve cost benefit estimates, estimating net programme impacts 
is more difficult since a comparison group must be identified. A comparison group can be non-
participating benefit claimants with similar characteristics, or those not eligible for a programme 
due to living in a non-pilot area, for example. 
•	 In	estimating	and	reporting	net	impacts,	it	is	important	to	explain	the	reasons	for	choosing	a	
comparison group, in order to help establish the validity of this group as suitable and relevant for 
the evaluation design. 
•	 It	is	recommended	that	in	the	establishment	of	a	new	policy,	careful	design	for	a	pilot	should	
take place and include a design for the evaluation which enables identification of a net impact. 
In the absence of a pilot, included in the design of the policy should be an evaluation design 
which enables net impacts and consideration of value for money for the policy programme to 
be established. In discussing a planned policy, an explanation of the considerations made in this 
design should be made, and such an explanation is also needed in the case where a decision 
is made not to establish an evaluation design for a policy, together with discussion of the 
implications this has for identifying the net impacts and value for money for the policy. 
Multiple participation
This research explores whether evaluation studies can be readily redesigned to address multiple 
participation. 







(participation dynamics of when people participate with the programme combinations they 
undertake).
For all types of multiple participation, a descriptive assessment of the programme complexity (with 
regard to the observed scale of what programme choices occur for participants and the description 
of the types of participant in each) is required as part of impact analyses. This assessment needs to 
be included in the CBA. 
Summary





The first two types of multiple participation require impact estimation to apply methods which 
account for the various alternative programme choices. Applying the Lechner (2001) framework, 
usually carried out using the Sianesi (2004) stata software, one can estimate the effect of one 
option as compared to one or several other options. In practice, there are two informative estimates 
which can be achieved: 
1 an estimate of the average programme effect in one particular option compared to non-
participation	in	any	of	the	programmes;	or	
2 a comparison of participating in one particular option as compared to another option (‘Pairwise 
comparison’). 
For multiple participation due to repetition of programme participation or participation dynamics, we 
additionally recommend discussion and estimation of the scale and timing of multiple participation 
observed. This will provide descriptive evidence of how important these issues might be. 
In the absence of applying more recently developed techniques which account for multiple 
participation, where there is substantial multiple participation and the characteristics of those with 
second participation differ statistically (determined with t-tests or appropriate testing) from those 
with first participation only, then the impact estimate analyses should be constrained to the first 
participation. For the CBA, this means that the total additional time generated is for those who are 
on their first participation. If the characteristics are statistically similar, then proceed with caution 




The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) commissioned this study in 2008 with the primary 
aim of informing cost benefit estimates that are derived following the Cost-Benefit Framework 
(CBF). Since then, the department has produced a Social Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) Framework that 
complements the CBF (see, Fujiwara, 2010). The social framework discusses evidence relating to 
wider impacts of employment and training programmes. It also makes recommendations for how 
some specific impacts should be quantified and monetised. 
The secondary aim of this project was to explore the feasibility and value of making further 
improvements to estimates of net benefits across New Deal employment programmes. This 
research builds on the external review of the DWP CBF carried out by Greenberg and Knight in 2007 
(Working Paper No. 40). Further detail of the extent of the research is now outlined. 
1.1 Operational background and context of the research
DWP runs a range of employment programmes. The department has regularly undertaken 
comparative cost benefit analyses (CBAs) of large numbers of these programmes. These exercises 
estimate the absolute and relative cost effectiveness of the various interventions. The department 
also frequently undertakes CBAs for individual employment programmes at the appraisal and 
evaluation stages of the policy cycle. 
To aid comparability and consistency in the assessment of its policies and programmes, the DWP 
has developed a CBF. This framework describes the steps that should be taken and the assumptions 
that should be made when conducting a CBA of an employment programme. The CBF ultimately 
attempts to ensure that public funds are spent efficiently and on programmes that generate the 
greatest net benefits to society. 
At the inception of this project in late 2008, CBAs produced following the CBF occasionally utilised 
estimates of earnings in work and the duration of additional jobs (the latter occasionally being 
a necessary input for a CBA) based on somewhat ad hoc assumptions. This was due to a lack of 
resources required to obtain more robust estimates. Similarly, many of the possible wider benefits 
and costs of DWP employment programmes such as improved health outcomes, reductions in 
crime, and general equilibrium effects were not quantified and monetised in internal CBAs due to a 
lack of reliable evidence. These wider impacts are now incorporated in internal CBAs drawing upon 
evidence collected in this report as well as other sources (Fujiwara, 2010). 
This report has helped inform the Social CBA Framework. It should also enable DWP to make further 
improvements to the reliability and usefulness of their CBA estimates by, for example, taking 
forward some of the recommendations from the external review of the CBF by Greenberg and Knight 
(2007). It uses some recent DWP datasets such as the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey and 
existing methodologies to explore opportunities to improve CBA practice and the quality of internal 
estimates.
The research aims to provide recommendations with regard to the evidence gaps and seeks to 
inform with regard to key questions in using CBF to guide analyses. 
Introduction
61.2 Scope of the research 
The research consisted of two components: a literature review and new empirical estimates from 
DWP administrative data. 





The analysis of the administrative data provides: 
•	 empirical	estimates	of	gross	duration	of	benefits	and	employment,	and	annual	nominal	 
taxable earnings. 
These estimates have been produced for the range of New Deal programmes. It is emphasised that 
these are not net impact estimates. 
1.3 Review research methods
We reviewed DWP documents passed by the project manager, which included the 2008 CBF 
guidance, 2008 versions of the 2005/06 employment programme CBAs, any later CBA results 
available, internal documents reporting on wider effects, and cost-effectiveness analyses. We note 
that the project was substantially delayed by data access issues, which led to a relatively long 
timeframe for the project. During this time, the materials such as the CBF guidance have altered. We 
have tried to acknowledge this. 
The focus of the literature review was determined with reference to the research brief set out by 
DWP and through meetings with the DWP project leader. A prioritisation was made in key areas 
where development was preferred by DWP, and revisions occurred to the project focus in subsequent 
teleconference review meetings or by agreement in email communications. It is noted that the 
key areas for development were defined as those where an improvement would make a significant 
difference to the estimates reported, and where such a change could be obtained at relatively low 
cost. The literature review research provides a critical assessment, as well as an examination of the 
general cost-benefit literature on specific points.
1.4 Outline of this report
The general equilibrium literature review is contained in Chapter 2. Following this, Chapter 3 
contains a discussion of subgroup impacts, including subgroups of the outcome distribution which 
are estimated with quantile regression. Then in Chapter 4, the methods for estimating net impacts 
on duration of benefits and employment and wages are considered. This is followed by empirical 
estimates for duration of benefits and employment, and earnings levels in Chapter 5. These 
estimates are limited to gross estimates for New Deal programmes. Multiple participation and how 
to account for it is covered in Chapter 6. This is done by examining the available data and what 
further simple estimates can provide information on multiple participation. In addition, we assess 
that evaluation study designs could be altered to ensure that this required information is collected in 
future, even if more rigorous impacts that account for multiple participation are not estimated. 
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7The references are split into two reference lists so that key sections are easily found. In particular 
the references for the General Equilibrium review in Chapter 2 are separated, and follow the general 
references. 
There are four appendices. The first, Appendix A, contains tables of the empirical gross estimates for 
New Deal programmes from Chapter 5. Appendix B has detailed data information related to Chapter 5. 
Appendix C contains more detailed discussion of the econometric methods for producing quantile 
treatment effects for subgroups of the outcome variable. Appendix D has descriptive information on 
the available DWP datasets, as sourced from DWP in 2008. 
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This chapter examines the literature for general equilibrium analyses and assesses how best to use 
this evidence to inform Department for Work and Pensions cost benefit analysis (CBA). 
2.1 Introduction
The employment and training programmes that are assessed using the Cost Benefit Framework 
(CBF) guidance may have effects on the well-being of those who are not enrolled in the programme 
and, because of this, on the economy. Such effects include substitution effects, displacement 
effects, equilibrium wage effects, multiplier effects, and entry effects. The current CBF contains 
recommendations for treating substitution effects as part of sensitivity tests, but does not contain 
recommendations concerning the remainder of these effects.
This chapter describes what is known about these so-called ‘general equilibrium effects’. It discusses 
when they are likely to be important and when they are not, and then examines the available 
empirical evidence. Most importantly, we inform on plausible ranges for substitution effects (note 
that these are confusingly called displacement effects in the United States (US) literature). To 
investigate a plausible range, we have conducted a limited literature review of sizes found to date. 
As will be seen, however, empirical evidence about the magnitudes of substitution effects and other 
general equilibrium effects is quite limited. 
Estimation of general equilibrium effects is not performed within this project, as the returns to 
estimation are likely to be low relative to the time and resources required. We also do not consider 
monopoly rents – no existing research has been found that estimates monopoly rents and so 
selection of a more appropriate measure is considered outside the remit of this project. 
We support the conclusion of Greenberg and Knight (2007) that, except in those rare instances when 
a reliable estimate exists, the best course of action is simply acknowledging the possible existence of 
general equilibrium effects and discussing whether they are likely to be important. The information 
and tables contained in this review can inform this discussion. In some cases, they can also be used 
to guide sensitivity tests to support a conclusion about the likely importance of these effects. 
2.2 Definitions of types of general equilibrium effects
Before discussing the empirical evidence, we first define these various effects1 and then examine 
some of the factors that influence them.
2.2.1 Substitution effects
By increasing job skills or increasing the number of persons seeking employment or their intensity 
of job search, employment and training programme may increase competition for available jobs. 
Hence, programme participants may end up in jobs that would otherwise have been held by non-
1 Different authors use the terms discussed below to mean different things. For example, US 
economists usually refer to what we are calling ‘substitution effects’ as ‘displacement’ effects. 
We attempt to use these terms consistently in accordance with the definitions provided in the 
text of this report.
General equilibrium analyses
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non-participants. If workers who are substituted against become unemployed or accept lower-wage 
jobs, their earnings are obviously less than they otherwise would be. The benefits of employment 
and training programmes on society as a whole will therefore be less than the benefits received by 
programme participants.
2.2.2 Fiscal substitution effects
A somewhat different sort of substitution effect, but with similar implications for policy, is 
sometimes called a ‘fiscal substitution’ effect (Johnson and Tomola, 1977). This effect can occur 
in the case of programmes (which are often called ‘wage subsidy programmes’) that pay subsidies 
to private sector employers that hire members of specific disadvantaged target groups and 
programmes (which are sometimes referred to as ‘public sector employment’) that directly place 
targeted disadvantaged individuals into jobs at government agencies or non-profit institutions. In 
this case, the targeted workers may be hired instead of, or even replace, those who are not targeted 
and, hence, more expensive to employ. It is also possible that some of the same persons who 
employers would have employed in the absence of a wage subsidy or public sector employment 
programme are employed under the programme and, thus, essentially replace themselves. In this 
instance, the employer receives a windfall, but substitution does not occur because there is no effect 
on non-participants in the programme. There is instead what Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstrom 
(2002) term a ‘deadweight effect’. Deadweight effects are especially likely if the programme is not 
tightly targeted on a particular disadvantaged group.
2.2.3 Displacement effects 
These effects occur if some firms expand at the expense of others because their employment costs 
are subsidised by the government.
2.2.4 Equilibrium wage effects
If participants in an employment and training programme search harder for jobs or their job skills 
increase and, as a result, their weeks or hours are greater than they otherwise would have been, 
then the resulting increase in labour supply will tend to put downward pressure on the equilibrium 
wage within the labour markets in which they work. If the programme tends to reduce job vacancies 
– for example, by making job search more efficient or imparting job skills that are in demand – this 
will also increase downward wage pressures. Thus, workers who are employed in the same labour 
markets as programme participants could receive lower wages than otherwise would be the case. 
Notice that if wage rates are lower than they would be without a programme, then this will tend to 
mitigate substitution effects resulting from the programme.
2.2.5 Multiplier effects 
In the absence of full-employment, expenditures on employment and training programmes can 
potentially stimulate the economy through so-called multiplier effects. That is, as individuals are 
hired to provide training or equipment is purchased to operate the programmes, the recipients of 
these expenditures will, in turn, spend their newly gained revenues, and this, in turn, will generate 
still more revenues that will be spent, and so forth. Each round of additional expenditures will, of 
course, result in increased hiring. It is important to emphasise that these multiplier effects are 
only germane when unemployment is substantial – that is, at least five or six per cent. Otherwise, 
programme expenditures will tend mainly to bid up prices and wages. 
2 Indeed, as pointed out by Davidson and Woodbury (1993), because it is now more difficult for 
unemployed non-participants to find jobs, they may search for jobs less diligently.
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2.2.6 Entry and deterrent effects
If employment and training programmes are perceived as beneficial, but are available only to 
benefit recipients, some persons may take up benefits in order to qualify. On the other hand, in 
the case of mandatory programmes for benefit recipients, some individuals who might otherwise 
have taken up benefits may decide not to do so in order to avoid the ‘hassle’ of participating in the 
programme. The latter negative effect on entry is sometimes known as a ‘deterrent effect’. Manski 
and Garfinkel (1992) and Moffitt (1992, 1996), among others, argue that both positive and negative 
programme ‘entry effects’ such as these could be substantial.
Entry and deterrent effects are not equilibrium effects in the same way as substitution and 
displacement effects and equilibrium wage effects are because they do not work through labour 
markets. They instead affect enrolment in benefit programmes. As discussed in the next section, 
positive entry effects are only likely to occur in the long-run and, hence, are likely to be missed in 
evaluations and CBA of new training and employment programmes. Negative entry effects (i.e. 
deterrent effects) can occur in the short-run and, by definition, keep individuals from enrolling 
in benefit programmes in order to avoid participating in mandatory employment and training 
programmes. Thus, deterrent effects are a general equilibrium effect of employment and training 
programmes in the sense that they affect the well-being of individuals who are not enrolled in these 
programmes.
The importance of the equilibrium effects defined above and exactly how they manifest themselves 
depends on the specific characteristics of the employment and training programmes under 
consideration, the state of the relevant labour markets, and a number of other factors. These are 
considered next. Following that, we review empirical attempts to estimate the size of the effects.
2.3 Factors influencing equilibrium effects
3
As just suggested, different types of employment and training programmes have different 
equilibrium effects. For purposes of discussion, we distinguish between ‘supply-side programmes’ 
and ‘demand-side programmes’. The former provides job search assistance, training, and financial 
incentives that encourage individuals to seek employment and helps them to enter employment. 
The latter subsidises employers for employing certain categories of disadvantaged workers or  
places such workers directly into jobs, often within the public and non-profit sectors. As noted  
above, we refer to such programmes as ‘wage subsidies programmes’ and ‘public sector 
employment’, respectively.
2.3.1 Substitution effects
Regular substitution effects, as opposed to fiscal substitution effects, result from supply-side 
employment and training programmes. If supply-side programmes cause programme participants 
to search for jobs more diligently or more effectively or increases their job skills, then some of their 
increases in employment may come at the expense of non-participants. 
The importance of substitution effects partially depends on the number of existing job vacancies. 
The fewer the number of job vacancies, the more difficult it is for unemployed non-participants in 
supply-side programmes to find jobs that are alternatives to those taken by participants. Thus, the 
magnitude of substitution effect is likely to reflect the state of the relevant local labour markets. 
3 Useful theoretical frameworks for examining the general equilibrium effects of employment 




If a local labour market in which former programme participants work is tight (i.e. the ratio of 
vacancies to job seekers is high), then alternative job opportunities are likely to be available to those 
outside	the	programme	target	group;	but	if	it	is	loose,	then	the	cost	of	substitution	to	those	affected	
could be substantial. However, even if there is a substantial substitution effect, it is unlikely to be 
permanent. If the economy is expanding, substitution effects should diminish over time, as job 
opportunities become open and absorb those who were substituted against. Thus, the substitution 
effect is likely to be more important in the short-run than in the long-run.
Several arguments have been put forward to suggest that substitution may not seriously undermine 
the effectiveness of supply-side programmes. First, if macroeconomic policy can keep aggregate 
unemployment rates low, then it should be relatively easy for displaced ineligibles to find alternative 
job opportunities. Second, as Cohen (1969) and Johnson (1979) suggest, if programme participants 
are less likely to seek employment while in the programme (for example, if they are receiving 
training they consider valuable) than they otherwise would have been (a so-called ‘locking-in effect’, 
then this opens more jobs to ineligibles, at least temporarily. Third, if they improve job matching 
or increase the work-skills of participants, supply-side programmes should make it less expensive 
for employers to fill positions. As a result, employers may be willing to hire more workers at a given 
wage. Fourth, if wage rates decline as a consequence of increased competition in job markets that 
is attributable to supply-side programmes, then this will tend to increase employment and offset 
substitution effects. Fifth, as emphasised by Johnson (1979) and Katz (1994), if training programmes 
can impart skills that allow trainees to leave slack occupational labour markets for tight ones, they 
can decrease the competition for job vacancies in the slack markets, thereby making it easier for 
ineligibles in these markets to find jobs. Such a possibility could produce a result that is the exact 
opposite of a substitution effect – total employment could increase by more than the number of 
persons who are trained.4
2.3.2 Fiscal substitution effects
Fiscal substitution effects result from demand-side programmes5. Much of what was said above 
about substitution effects that result from supply-side programmes is also applicable to fiscal 
substitution effects. For example, locking-in effects, a relatively large number of job vacancies and 
expansions in the economy are all likely to reduce the size of fiscal substitution effects. Demand-
side programmes differ from supply-side programmes, however, because they are not primarily 
intended to improve job matching or job skills, and this may cause the substitution effects resulting 
from these programmes to be more severe. However, to the extent that a wage subsidy or a public 
sector employment programme focuses on placing low-skilled workers into jobs, it will change the 
composition of the non-employed in the direction of increased skill levels. Thus, those who remain in 
the non-employed pool may have less difficulty in ultimately finding jobs on their own, than would 
programme participants.
4 Johnson (1979) suggests that whether this occurs depends on wages adjusting sluggishly 
in the slack labour market and trainees being readily absorbed into the tight market. 
Furthermore, as Johnson notes, it will occur less to the extent that the programme induces 
non-workers to enter the workforce or merely moves workers from one slack labour market to 
another. In addition, as Hamermesh (1972) and Hall (1979) point out, the training must be for 
jobs for which vacancies exists.
5 Much of the literature on demand-side programmes is concerned with temporary programmes 
aimed	principally	at	reducing	cyclical	unemployment	(for	example,	see	Kopits,	1978;	Johnson	
and	Tomola,	1977;	Knabe,	2008,	and	the	references	therein).	Our	major	concern	here,	in	
contrast, is with permanent programmes aimed at increasing the employment of certain 
categories of disadvantaged workers, such as lone parents or the long-termed unemployed. 
Both types of demand-side programmes can result in fiscal substitution effects, however.
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In contrast to supply-side programmes, demand-side programmes may generate substitution 
effects that can grow over time, especially if the programmes are viewed by employers as relatively 
permanent. The reason is that participants in these programmes are less expensive to employ than 
non-participants, but it may take employers time to make the adjustments necessary to replace 
regular employees with programme participants. This may be especially likely if, as is often the case, 
demand-side programmes stipulate that the programme participants who are hired perform work 
that will not otherwise be performed. If employers attempt to circumvent such constraints, it will 
take them some time to do so.
2.3.3 Displacement effects
Displacement effects are only likely to take place if a programme gives some employers a 
competitive advantage over other employers. Thus, in the case of employment and training 
programmes, the possibility of displacement effects are mainly restricted to demand-side 
programmes that pay subsidies to private sector employers to hire additional workers or hire certain 
categories of workers. Displacement occurs if employers that expand their employment as a result 
of the subsidy do so at the expense of employers at competing firms who find it necessary to 
contract their employment6.
2.3.4 Equilibrium wage effects
Demand-side employment and training programmes could increase employer demand for workers 
and, hence, result in some upward pressure on wages. This might occur because the programmes 
make at least certain categories of workers less expensive to hire or because substitution is 
incomplete, perhaps due to programme rules, and, as a result, more jobs and job vacancies result.
Supply-side programmes, in contrast, tend to increase competition in labour markets, thereby 
resulting in downward pressure on wages. Potentially, this would tend to mitigate substitution 
effects. However, if they improve job matching or increase the work-skills of participants, supply-
side programmes should make it less expensive for employers to fill positions. As a consequence, 
employer demand for workers will increase, at least partially offsetting downward pressure on 
wages that result from increased competition in the labour market. For any downward pressure  
on wages to actually result in wage rates that are much lower than they otherwise would be, 
however, three conditions must hold: (1) the minimum wage must not constrain downward 
movements	in	wage	rates;	(2)	programme	participants	must	account	for	a	fairly	large	share	of	 
the	workers	in	the	relevant	labour	markets;	and	(3)	programme	effects	on	job	search	and	
employment must be fairly large.
Most supply-side programmes seem unlikely to bring about large equilibrium wage effects. Most 
participants who are employed because of the programmes tend to work in low-wage labour 
markets. Thus, at least to some degree, the minimum wage probably constrains reductions in 
equilibrium wages. Moreover, the programme target groups tend to be narrow (e.g. the disabled 
and persons with serious health problems, the long-term unemployed, lone parents, etc.). Thus, 
members of these groups usually account for only a fairly small proportion of the total supply 
population in any given labour market. Finally, programme impacts are typically fairly modest. 
Thus, most supply-side programmes seem unlikely to bring about large equilibrium wage effects.
6 Knabe (2008) presents a theoretical comparison of displacement among different forms of 




In general, multiplier effects are probably best ignored in cost-benefit studies of employment and 
training programmes unless it can be argued that, in the absence of these programmes, there 
would be no multiplier effects. For this to occur the expenditures that would have been made on 
the programmes would have to be used to reduce taxes and these tax reductions would then have 
to be saved by those who receive them. Or, alternatively, the reduction in expenditures could be 
used to reduce the government’s deficit. If the revenues that would have been expended on the 
programmes are instead used for other purchases, either by the government or private individuals, 
the multiplier effects would continue to exist, although they could, perhaps, be somewhat larger or 
smaller than those generated by the employment and training programmes. 
2.3.6 Entry and deterrent effects
To qualify for many employment and training programmes, individuals must often be on benefits 
of some kind. Because of this link between benefit programmes and employment and training 
programmes, entry onto benefits may be influenced either positively or negatively, depending upon 
whether participation in the programme is a mandatory requirement for receiving benefits or is 
instead voluntary.7 A mandatory programme can have both positive and negative entry effects. 
On the one hand, if an employment programme appears attractive to individuals – for example, in 
terms of increasing their earnings potential – then they may do whatever is necessary to qualify 
for benefits (even leaving a low-wage job, or extending their time on benefits to qualify if there is 
a specified period of benefit receipt for eligibility) so that they can participate in the programme, 
a positive entry effect. On the other hand, if the programme appears unattractive – for example, 
it appears likely to take up one’s time with little offsetting rewards – then individuals may be 
deterred from taking up benefits even if they otherwise qualify, a negative entry effect. In contrast 
to mandatory employment and training programmes, voluntary programmes should only result 
in positive entry effects onto benefits because whatever is deemed onerous about the training 
programme can be avoided by simply deciding not to participate in it.
In the case of a new employment and training programme, there may be little in the way of positive 
entry effects, because the payoff from participating in the programme is likely to be unknown. 
However, deterrent effects can occur early on in the case of a mandatory programme because the 
time requirement of participating in the programme and the tasks that would have to be performed 
would be readily apparent.
Entry and deterrent effects have obvious implications for how employment and training 
programmes affect caseload size. They also have implications for assessing the effects of new 
employment and training programmes on employment and earnings because these effects are 
usually	measured	by	studying	the	existing	pool	of	those	on	benefits;	but	entry	and	deterrent	
effects affect the composition of those who receive benefits over time and, therefore, may cause 
programme effects on employment and earnings to change over time. These changes will usually 
not be observed. In addition, deterrent effects may bias the estimates of employment and earnings 
effects in the case of both new and long existing employment and training programme because the 
programme’s effects on those who are deterred from taking up benefits cannot be observed.
As just suggested, standard programme evaluation methods usually fail to capture entry and 
deterrent effects. They usually must be assessed by separate studies. The approaches that have 
been used in such studies are described later.
7 For a detailed analysis, see Moffitt, 1996.
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2.4 Review of empirical evidence on equilibrium effects
2.4.1 Substitution effects
With only a few exceptions, empirical studies of substitution effects have used one of the following 
three approaches: (1) surveys in which employers or programme participants are asked whether 
the work performed by programme participants would have been performed in the absence of the 
programme;	(2)	econometric	macroeconomic	evaluations	that	estimate	relationships	between	
aggregate variables such as employment or unemployment and various measures of programme 
size	such	as	programme	expenditures	or	the	number	of	participants;	and	(3)	using	general	
equilibrium models to predict programme effects. As discussed below, all three approaches are 
subject to important limitations.
The survey approach has been almost entirely limited to attempting to estimate fiscal substitution 
effects resulting from demand-side programmes – that is, public sector employment and wage 
subsidy programmes. In principle, the survey approach should capture deadweight effects, as well 
as substitution effects, although it usually would be difficult to distinguish between the two. This 
approach is obviously limited because neither employers nor programme participants may have a 
very accurate idea of whether the work that participants perform would have been performed if 
the programme did not exist, a hypothetical situation. Moreover, if there are restrictions on using 
programme participants to perform regular work, then employers may not want to admit that 
violations of these restrictions are occurring. 
The macroeconomic approach attempts to exploit the fact that the size of employment and training 
programmes varies geographically and over time and thus programme effects on employment 
and unemployment should also vary. To illustrate with one of a number of alternative regression 
specifications that has been used, the number of employed non-participants can be regressed 
against a time lagged measure of the number of employed former programme participants and a 
set of control variables. A coefficient of -.5 would imply that for every 100 programme participants 
that obtain jobs as a result of the programme, 50 non-participants would be non-employed due 
to the programme. Similarly, a coefficient of -1 would imply full substitution so that no increase 
in employment results from the programme. In principle, the estimates made with this approach 
for wage subsidy programmes should incorporate displacement effects, as well as substitution 
effects. In most cases, it would be difficult to determine the individual contributions of these 
two effects. The major problem with the macroeconomic approach is reverse causality, which is 
recognised by virtually all the analysts who have used the approach. That is, although employment 
and unemployment may be affected by programme participation, the opposite may also be true. 
Government investments in employment and training programmes are likely to be larger in places 
and at times when unemployment is relatively high and employment is relatively low than when the 
opposite conditions exist. Various instrumental variables and lag structures have been used to try to 
mitigate the reverse causality problem, but it is not clear how successful these attempts are.
General equilibrium modelling has been used relatively infrequently because the effort required 
to build such models is considerable, and they are specific to a given programme of interest and 
not readily adapted to analysing other programmes. Both direct and indirect programme effects 
must be formally modelled and values must be assigned to each parameter in the model. To the 
extent possible, these values are taken from existing information and previous research. If they 
do not exist, the model builders can estimate them or make plausible assumptions about them. 
When uncertainty exists about some of the parameters, sensitivity tests are usually made by using 
alternative values. In addition to concern over whether the correct parameter values are used, a 
potential drawback of general equilibrium modelling is that key relationships may be overlooked or 
incorrectly modelled. Unfortunately, there is rarely any way to verify the accuracy of the model’s 




Findings from various studies of substitution effects that rely on the survey, econometric estimation, 
and general equilibrium modelling approaches are summarised in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, 
respectively. The survey approach has been used only to estimate fiscal substitution effects for 
demand-side programmes and general equilibrium models have been limited to analyses of supply-
side programmes. Econometric estimates of substitution effects have been made for both demand- 
and supply-side programmes. Thus, the studies in Table 2.2 have been grouped separately by these 
two types of programmes. A few econometric studies have utilised micro-data on individuals or 
firms, but most have relied on macro-data.
Table 2.1 Estimates of fiscal substitution effects for demand-side programmes  
 from surveys
Country Study Type of programme
Size of substitution 
effect1
% Source4
Sweden LO (1993 and 1994) PSE 20-39 CFH
Sweden Temo (1993-1995) PSE 3-17 CFH
Sweden NUTEK (1994) PSE 30 CFH
Sweden Hallstrom (1995) PSE 20-25 CFH
Sweden AMS (1997) PSE 8-24 CFH
Sweden AMS (1998a) PSE 13-27 CFH
Sweden AMS (1998b) PSE 0-14 CFH
Sweden Johansson (1999) PSE 11-26 CFH
Netherlands DeMunnik (1992) PSE 15 OECD
US National Commission for 
Manpower Policy (1978)
PSE 18 Authors
Sweden Sehlstedt and Shroder (1989) Wage subsidy 23 to 49 CFH
Sweden AMS (1995) Wage subsidy 36 CFH
Sweden Anxo and Dahlin (1996) Wage subsidy 69-84 CFH
Sweden AMS (1997) Wage subsidy 42-48 CFH
Sweden AMS (1998a) Wage subsidy 40-51 CFH
Sweden AMS (1998b) Wage subsidy 32-35 CFH
United Kingdom Atkinson and Meager (1994) Wage subsidy Over 80 JVG
Netherlands DeKoning et al. (1995) Wage subsidy Over 85 JVG
Netherlands DeKoning et al. (1995) Wage subsidy Over 90 JVG
Belgium Van der Linden (1995) Wage subsidy Over 90 JVG
France Belleville (2001) Wage subsidy 69-80 Authors
Ireland Breen and Halpin (1989) Wage subsidy 952 OECD
Australia Department of Employment, 
Education and Training (1989)
Wage subsidy 67-793 OECD
Notes: PSE = Public Sector Employment programmes.
1 The estimated effect may include deadweight, as well as substitution effects.
2	 A	decomposition	of	the	effects	indicate	the	following:	deadweight	–	70	per	cent;	substitution	–	21	per	cent;	
displacement – four per cent. 
3 Deadweight only.
4 This column indicates whether the estimates in the third column were obtained from Calmfors, Forslund, 
and Hemstrom, 2002 (CFH), from Jongen, Van Gameren, and Graafland 2003 (JVG), from the July 1993 issue 
of Employment Outlook published by OECD, or directly from the study listed in the second column (authors).
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Sweden Gramlich and Ysander (1981) PSE Road construction: 100%
Health and welfare: 0% CFH
Sweden Forslund (1996) PSE Work experience: 0%
Relief work: 84%
Youth programmes: 76% CFH
Sweden Forslund and Krueger (1997) PSE Construction: 69%
Health and welfare: 0% CFH
Sweden Lofgren and Wikstrom (1997) PSE Work experience: 0%
Relief work: 0%
Youth programmes: 94% CFH
Sweden Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) PSE 66% CFH
Sweden Edin, Forslund and Holmlund (1999) PSE Youth programmes: 76% CFH
Sweden Dahlberg and Forslund (2005) PSE 65% Authors
Sweden Holmlund (1995) PSE Youth: 80% P
Sweden Skedinger (1995) PSE Youth: 40-110% CFH
Poland Puhani (1999, 2002) PSE Inconclusive findings Authors
US Johnson and Tomola (1977) PSE Small initially, but about 
100% after 1st year
Authors
US National Planning Association (1974) PSE 46% JT
US Wiseman (1976) PSE 39% JT
US
Farkas, Smith, and Stronmsdorfer 
(1983)1 PSE Youth: 26% Authors
Sweden Lofgren and Wikstrom (1997) Wage subsidy 0% CFH
Sweden Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) Wage subsidy 65% CFH
Finland Kangashaju and Venctoklis (2003) Wage subsidy Over 100% K
Denmark Rotger and Arendt (2010)1 Wage subsidy 0% Authors
Netherlands DeKoning et al. (1992) Wage subsidy 69-76% OECD
Poland Puhani (1999, 2002) Wage subsidy Inconclusive findings Authors
US Perloff and Wachter (1979)1 Wage subsidy 67% Authors
US Farkas, Smith, and Stronmsdorfer 
(1983)1
Wage subsidy Youth: 47% Authors
Sweden Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) Mixed wage 
subsidy and 
PSE







Size of substitution 
effect Source3
Supply-side programmes
Sweden Forslund (1996) Training 0% CFH 
Sweden Lofgren and Wikstrom (1997) Training 0% CFH
Sweden Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) Training 0% CFH
Sweden Dahlberg and Forslund (2005) Training 11% Authors
Sweden Calmfors and Skedinger (1995)  Training Inconclusive but 
probably a small 
effect
Authors
E. Germany Hagen and Steiner (2001) Training 65% Authors




with the possibility of 
small short-run effect 







Finland Rantala (1995) Training and PSE Youth: very small 
effect
P 
Finland Pehkonen (1997) Training and PSE Youth: possibly 
substantial effect
Authors
Finland Ericksson and Pehkonen (1998) Training and PSE Possibly substantial Authors
UK Blundell et al. (2004) Job search and 
wage subsidy





et al. (2008) studies are based on micro data on individuals. The Rotger and Arendt (2010) study is based on 
micro data on firms. The remaining studies are all based on aggregated macro-data.
2 For studies based on macro-data, estimates for wage subsidy programmes may incorporate displacement 
effects, as well as substitution effects. 
3 This column indicates whether the estimates in the fourth column were obtained from Calmfors, Forslund, 
and Hemstrom, 2002 (CFH), from Pehkonen, 1997 (P), from Johnson and Tomola, 1977 (JT), the July 1993 




Table 2.3 Estimates of substitution effects for supply-side programmes from  




Size of substitution 
effect Source1
US Davidson and Woodbury (1993) Financial 
incentives
30-60% Authors
Canada Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) Financial 
incentives
Very large Authors
Australia Dixon and Rimmer Financial 
incentive
60% in short-run, but 
diminishing over time
Authors
Australia Dixon and Rimmer Job search 70% in short-run, but 
diminishing over time
Authors
1 The estimates in the fourth column were all obtained directly from the studies listed in the second column. 
Whenever possible, the magnitude of the substitution effect has been shown as the ratio of the 
number of jobs lost by non-participants due to a programme’s substitution effect to the number 
of jobs gained by programme participants. Thus, a substitution effect of 30 per cent would imply 
that for every 100 programme participants that obtain jobs as a result of the programme, 30 non-
participants would be non-employed due to the programme.8 Precise estimates of substitution 
effect ratios cannot be obtained from some of the studies listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, either because 
the estimates are in a form that is not readily converted into a ratio or because the findings are of 
low statistical significance or are not very robust to alternative regression specifications. In these 
instances, orders of magnitude suggested by those conducting the studies are indicated.
As is evident from the tables, many of the findings for substitution effects are for Sweden, a country 
that, in comparison to other countries, has traditionally made relatively large expenditures in 
employment and training programmes as a percentage of GDP (Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstrom, 
2002). Thus, Swedish policy makers have particular reason to be concerned with substitution effects 
and they may be more readily detected in that country. 
Only three of the studies listed in the tables pertain to the UK. Although two of these studies use 
an econometric approach to examine substitution effects, and therefore appear in Table 2.2, unlike 
most of the other studies in that table, they are based on data on individuals, rather than on macro-
data.9 The Blundell et al. (2004) study used a difference-in-differences methodology to determine 
whether the New Deal for Young People programme had an impact on the employment status of 
persons who were not eligible to participate in the programme. Similarly, the Adams et al. (2008) 
study used the difference-in-differences methodology to determine whether the Pathways to Work 
programme had an impact on the benefit status of persons who were ineligible to participate.
Tables 2.1-2.3 indicate that there is a great deal of variation in the estimates of substitution effects. 
8 In principal, the size of the employment and training programme should not have very much 
of an effect on this ratio. For example, a wage subsidy programme could have a substitution 
effect of (say) 30 per cent regardless of whether it’s funding accounts for a large or small 
share of gross domestic product (GDP). However, econometric studies that rely on macro-data 
(i.e. most of those summarised in Table 2.2) are less likely to be able to detect the substitution 
effects resulting from a small programme than a large programme.




This variation is not surprising given that the estimates pertain to different time periods and 
geographic locations. Moreover, even within a given table, the methods used to obtain the estimates 
differ greatly. Furthermore, even when programmes are classified as being of the same type – for 
example, as a training programme or as a wage subsidy or public sector employment programme 
– they may differ in important respects. For example, one training programme may offer remedial 
education, another vocational education, and a third both.
Even given the variation among the estimates, however, a pattern is discernible. The estimates imply 
that demand-side programmes tend to result in much larger substitution effects than supply-side 
programmes. As can be seen in Table 2.2, this is true even when the same study uses the same 
methodology in estimating the substitution effects associated with both types of programmes. 
Examining the estimates produced by each methodological approach, it can be seen that those 
relying on the survey approach (Table 2.1) suggest that wage subsidy programmes tend to cause 
substantial substitution effects (which are often over 60 per cent), while the substitution effects 
resulting from public sector employment programmes are more moderate (that is, 30 per cent or 
less). Estimates based on the econometric approach (Table 2.2) seem to indicate that supply-side 
programmes probably do not cause very large substitution effects, but demand-side programmes, 
regardless of whether they are wage subsidy or public sector employment programmes, probably 
do, especially if they are targeted at youth. More specifically, of the 30 estimates appearing in Table 
2.2 for demand-side programmes, three are inconclusive, seven indicate that there is no substitution 
effect, and the remaining 20 estimates all suggest that the effect is large (typically over 50 per 
cent). In contrast, all but one of the seven estimates for supply-side programmes imply that the 
substitution effect resulting from such programmes is small, or at worst no more than moderate 
(that is, under 20 per cent). Contrary to the econometric estimates for supply-side programmes, 
estimates that rely on the general equilibrium models suggest that substitution effects for this type 
of programme are quite large (that is, over 50 per cent).10 The reasons for this difference are not 
apparent. 
What are the lessons from these findings for cost benefit analyses (CBAs) of employment and 
training programmes? It seems clear that the findings must be treated with great caution in 
using them in CBA. They vary greatly and the methodologies that underlie them are all subject to 
important weaknesses. Nevertheless, there appears to be considerable evidence that substitution 
effects are likely to be quite important when demand-side programmes are considered, suggesting 
that any CBAs of such programmes should be subject to sensitivity tests in which fairly large 
substitution effects are assumed. Results from this sensitivity test would then be compared to 
findings from the standard analysis in which no substitution effect is assumed. 
We suggest that a value towards the higher end of the scale be used as a plausible upper bound 
for this purpose. It may also be useful to conduct a second sensitivity analysis with a lower bound 
10 Bartik (2002) developed several models that are more or less in keeping with the general 
equilibrium approach to investigate the US welfare reform efforts around the turn of the 
century. These efforts resulted in substantial increases in the labour supply of lone parents. His 
models predict that the short-run substitution effects would be substantial, but fall over time. 
Jongen, Van Gameren and Graafland (2003) used a general equilibrium model to examine 
substitution and deadweight effects resulting from highly ‘stylised’ public sector employment, 
wage subsidy, and training programmes in the Netherlands, finding that these effects were 
quite large, especially for the first two programmes. Because these results are not based on 
actual programmes, they are not listed in Table 5.3.
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estimate in order to bracket the likely importance of substitution effects.11 For example, Table 
2.2 reports seven econometric estimates of the substitution effects resulting from wage subsidy 
programmes.	Two	of	these	estimates	imply	a	zero	substitution	effect;	one	indicates	that	it	is	47	per	
cent, and the remaining four estimates imply that it is at least 65 per cent.12 Similarly, five of the 13 
survey-based estimates in Table 2.1 imply that the substitution effects resulting from wage subsidy 
programmes are in the 30 to 50 per cent range, while the remaining seven estimates imply that it is 
above 70 per cent. Thus, 60 per cent, or even a larger value, might be used as an upper bound value 
for the substitution effect in conducting sensitivity analyses of wage subsidy programmes and 30 
per cent might be used as a lower-bound value. Based on the same evidence as that reviewed here, 
Fujiwara (2010) suggests conducting a single sensitivity test by using the mid-point between these 
two values, 45 per cent.
A similar approach can be used to obtain a substitution effect value that can be used in conducting 
sensitivity analyses of public sector employment programmes. Unfortunately, however, unlike 
the wage subsidy situation, substitution effect estimates based on the econometric and survey 
approaches diverge considerably. For example, there are 19 econometric estimates for public sector 
employment programmes in Table 2.2. Five of these estimates imply that there are no substitution 
effects;	three	imply	that	it	is	less	than	50	per	cent;	and	the	remaining	11	estimates	imply	that	it	is	at	
least 65 per cent. In contrast, the nine estimates relying on the survey approach that are reported in 
Table 2.1 imply that substitution effects resulting from public sector employment programmes are in 
the ten per cent to 30 per cent range. As discussed earlier, the econometric and survey approaches 
are each subject to important limitations. Consequently, it is difficult to determine which provides 
superior estimates of the substitution effect. Thus, we suggest that 60 per cent be used as an upper 
bound and 30 per cent as a lower bound for sensitivity analysis purposes in CBA of public sector 
employment programmes. Fujiwara (2010) again recommends using the mid-point of 45 per cent 
of these two bounds. We further suggest that in reporting the results of these sensitivity tests, it be 
stressed that the upper bound results are most consistent with substitution effect estimates based 
on the econometric approach and the lower bound findings reflect substitution effect estimates that 
rely on the survey approach.
If the economy is expanding, either 30 per cent or 60 per cent should probably be viewed as 
a short-run effect for demand-side programmes. As previously discussed, as job opportunities 
increase in a growing economy, workers who are substituted against should be able to find jobs and 
substitution effects should diminish over time. However, it is important to note that this expectation 
is conjectural, as the topic of how substitution effects resulting from demand-side programmes 
change over time has been little studied empirically. In general, the estimates of the substitution 
effects resulting from demand-side programmes that are provided by survey and econometric 
studies seem to pertain more to the short-run than to the long-run.
11 In determining this value, it would be helpful to compare the quality of the individual studies 
listed in Tables 2.1-2.3 and put the greatest weight on substitution effect estimates from the 
higher quality studies. However, as indicated in the tables, the estimates from many of the 
listed studies were obtained from secondary sources. These sources typically simply reported 
study findings without assessing study quality. Moreover, a number of these studies were 
written in foreign languages such as Swedish and thus were inaccessible to us.
12 Some individual studies provide a range of estimates, rather than a single point estimate. For 
purposes of the discussion in the text, we use the mid-point of the range. For example, the 
range in the DeKoning et al. (1992) study in Table 2.2 is 69 to 76 per cent. Thus, we use a value 




programmes, 60 per cent is a reasonable upper bound value and 30 per cent is a reasonable 
lower bound value to use for the short-run substitution effect. 
•	 In	reporting	sensitivity	results	for	demand-side	programmes,	it	should	be	emphasised	that	if	
the economy is growing, substitution effects would be expected to diminish over time.
•	 In	reporting	the	sensitivity	results	for	public	sector	employment	programmes,	it	should	be	
emphasised that while some econometric estimates suggest that the substitution effect 
might be as large as 60 per cent, or even larger, findings from the survey approach imply that 
they are 30 per cent or considerably smaller.
Most Department for Work and Pensions programmes are supply-side programmes. Unfortunately, 
there are fewer substitution effect estimates than in the case of demand-side programmes on 
which to base conclusions. Moreover, the evidence that exist concerning the size of substitution 
effects that result from supply-side programmes is not very clear. All but one of the seven estimates 
from econometric studies of such programmes suggest that the substitution effect is zero or quite 
small, while all four of the estimates from general equilibrium models imply that it is quite large. 
Although six of the seven econometric estimates are for training programmes and three of the 
four estimates from general equilibrium models are for financial incentive programmes, it is not 
obvious that substitution effects should differ in size between these two programme types. By using 
both approaches to estimate substitution effects for the same programme, perhaps a start can be 
made at reconciling differences between the findings resulting from the two approaches. Until then, 
the substitution effect value that should be used in conducting a sensitivity test of cost-benefit 
estimates for supply-side programmes is not obvious. 
One might argue, however, that because so few studies have been based on general equilibrium 
models and the models themselves have not been verified and are thus still speculative, the 
findings that rely on them should be ignored in conducting sensitivity tests. If this argument is 
accepted, then a very small value of, say, ten per cent or (as Fujiwara 2010 suggests) 20 per cent, 
which reflects findings based on the econometric approach, might be used as an upper bound 
for sensitivity analysis of supply-side programmes, while zero could be reasonably used as the 
lower bound. An alternative and perhaps better approach might be to forego sensitivity analyses 
altogether and simply caution readers about the possible existence of substitution effects by briefly 
reviewing the evidence presented in this report concerning them.
 
Because it is difficult to draw plausible conclusions from existing evidence concerning the size of 
substitution effects resulting from supply-side programmes, it may be best to forego sensitivity 
analyses for substitution effects in conducting CBAs of such programmes. Instead, readers 
of the studies can simply be cautioned about the possible existence of substitution effects 
by briefly reviewing the evidence presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 of this report. Alternatively, 
sensitivity analysis could be conducted using ten or 20 per cent as the upper bound value of  
the substitution effect and zero as the lower bound value, while, cautioning readers that 
findings based on general equilibrium models, which imply much larger substitution effects,  
are being ignored.
As in the case of demand-side programmes, substitution effects for supply-side programmes would 
be expected to diminish over time if the economy is expanding and those who are substituted again 
eventually obtain employment. In the case of supply-side programmes, empirical evidence exists 
that is consistent with this conjecture. For example, Adam et al. (2008) found that individuals who 
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received Jobseeker’s Allowance in several Pathways to Work sites and, hence, competed for jobs 
with incapacity claimants who were mandated onto the Pathways programme, were 3.5 per cent 
less likely to move off benefits within six months, evidence consistent with the possible existence 
of a substitution effect. After 12 months, this effect was less than half as large. Based on a general 
equilibrium model, Dixon and Rimmer (2006) estimated that the displacement effects of financial 
incentive and job search programmes would be very large after the programmes were introduced, 
about	60	and	70	per	cent,	respectively;	but	disappear	five	years	later	in	the	case	of	the	financial	
incentive programme and eight years later in the case of the job search programme. Their model, 
however, does not allow for exogenous job growth. The reduction in the substitution effect is instead 
predicted to occur because of downward pressure on wages caused by increases in labour supply 
resulting from the programmes.
2.4.2 Displacement effects
Separate empirical estimates of displacement effects do not appear to exist. However, displacement 
effects are mainly limited to wage subsidy programmes, and as indicated in the previous section, 
econometric estimates of the substitution effects engendered by wage subsidy programmes that 
are based on macro-data may incorporate displacement effects, as well as substitution effects. 
Thus, in conducting CBAs of wage subsidy programmes, sensitivity tests that assume substitution 
ratios of between 30 and 60 per cent, as recommended in the previous section, may be viewed as 
accounting for both displacement effects and substitution effects.
2.4.3 Equilibrium wage effects
It was suggested earlier that demand-side employment and training programmes might tend 
to put upward pressure on wages. Conceptually, as also suggested earlier, the effects of supply-
side programmes on wages appear to be somewhat ambiguous, but seem more likely to be 
negative than positive. Unfortunately for our purposes, most empirical attempts to investigate the 
equilibrium wage effects of employment and training programmes do not differentiate between 
demand- and supply-side programmes, but instead estimate a combined effect for the two types 
of programmes. For example, one well-known study estimated the effect on the wage growth of 
average compensation per employee of total national expenditures on employment and training 
programmes in 19 OECD countries (OECD, 1993). The resulting estimated effect was positive and 
statistically significant in ten countries, negative and significant in two countries, and small and 
statistically insignificant in seven countries (including the UK). 
However, Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstrom (2002) summarise findings from three Swedish 
studies that did provide separate estimates for demand- and supply-side programmes. Two of 
these studies, as expected, found that demand-side programmes had positive effects on wages 
in the short-run, while the remaining study found no short-run effect for these programmes13. 
One of the studies found that supply-side programmes had a negative short-run effect on wages, 
as anticipated, one found a negative effect with one regression specification and no effect with 
another, and the third study did not find an effect.
To summarise, there is some indication that, in general, employment and training programmes put 
upward pressure on wages, although, there is at least a bit of evidence from Sweden that supply-
side programmes may reduce wages. However, many studies of equilibrium wage effects have not 
obtained statistically significant results and few studies with statistically significant results have 
13 Calmfors, Forslund, and Hemstrom (2002) also report on finding from a study that examined 
a public sector employment programme, but not supply-side programmes. This study, as 
anticipated, found that the programme it examined put upward pressure on wages.
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found very large effects. Thus, in cost-benefit studies of employment and training employment 
programmes, it seems most reasonable to derive base-case estimates by assuming that there is no 
effect on wages. Sensitivity tests of the base-case for large-scale demand-side programmes might 
then be conducted by assuming that there is a small increase in wages of (say) one per cent or two. 
Similar sensitivity tests for supply-side programmes do not seem warranted. The evidence about 
even the direction of the wage effect resulting from these programmes is simply too weak.
 
In cost-benefit studies of employment and training employment programmes, base-case 
estimates should be first derived by assuming no effect on wages. Sensitivity tests of the 
base-case for large-scale demand-side programmes might then be conducted by assuming a 
small increase in wages of perhaps one or two per cent. Similar sensitivity tests for supply-side 
programmes are inappropriate because of weak  
evidence concerning these effects. 
2.4.4 Entry effects 
Our assessment of the theoretical arguments concerning entry effects is that their importance is 
somewhat speculative. Empirical evidence about the magnitude of entry effects is quite limited. 
With just a few exceptions, this evidence is all based on aggregate macro-data. They typically rely on 
time series comparisons of caseload size across geographical areas that vary in terms of programme 
participation. Moreover, the evidence is all limited to welfare-to-work programmes targeted on the 
US and Canadian welfare populations, often lone parents. Because they typically rely on macro-
data, rather than micro-data, studies of the entry effects of these programmes have usually been 
conducted separately from analyses of the impacts of these programmes on employment, although 
both studies are sometimes performed as part of the same evaluation. 
Most of the findings from these studies are consistent with what one might anticipate: voluntary 
programmes for welfare recipients appear to encourage modest entry onto the welfare rolls by 
providing services that may otherwise be difficult to obtain, while mandatory programmes seem 
to discourage entry modestly by raising the cost of receiving welfare (that is, they make it more 
burdensome to receive welfare). Thus, the effects for voluntary programmes appear to partially 
defeat one of the major purposes of such programmes, which is to reduce welfare caseloads.
Table 2.4 presents findings from ten empirical studies of training programmes for welfare recipients 
that provide some evidence on entry effects. All the listed programmes were located in the US.14 
Most of these studies are based on aggregate caseload data. They rely on regression adjusted 
14 A brief summary of the programmes listed in Table 2.4 follows. The Washington State Family 
Independence Program (FIP) provided financial incentives to Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Program (AFDC) recipients to encourage education, training, and work. The Oregon 
Demonstration Program (ODP) provided group job search, basic skills education, vocational 
training, and counselling. The Massachusetts Employment and Training Choices Program 
(ET) provided a variety of training opportunities to welfare recipients including on-the-job 
training, work experience, occupational training, and basic education. Job placement was also 
emphasised. The Ohio Community Work Experience Program (OHCWEP) provided a variety of 
services to AFDC recipients including job search, work experience, supported work, and on-
the-job training, The West Virginia Community Work Experience Program (WVA) required AFDC 
recipients to participate in work experience (i.e. they were assigned to government and non-
profit agencies in exchange for their grant). The California Greater Avenues for Independence 
Program (GAIN) was a demonstration programme that tested the effects of basic education, 
skills training, work experience, and job search on AFDC recipients.
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comparisons across study sites with and without the programme of interest and across time. Results 
from these studies tend to be sensitive to specification changes and to changes in methodology. 
Thus, as indicated in Table 2.4, there are two instances in which different researchers obtained 
somewhat conflicting findings. The first six studies listed in the table are of voluntary programmes 
and the remaining four are of mandatory programmes. The last three columns in the table report 
the study findings. The estimates in the first of these three columns pertain to the net effect of 
the studied programmes on the size of welfare caseloads. That is, they incorporate the effects of 
these programmes on entry onto, as well as exit from, the caseload. The second from last column 
indicates the estimated direction of exit effects.15 Caseload exit would occur if a welfare-to-work 
programme successfully places current welfare recipients into jobs with sufficiently high earnings 
so they no longer qualify for benefits. The last column presents estimates of programme effects 
on applications for welfare benefits, a measure of entry effects. As can be seen, there are far fewer 
separate estimates of entry and exit effects than of overall net effects. 
In order to make the results presented in Table 2.4 as comparable as possible across studies, the 
reported estimates are averaged over the time period examined in the study, which varies between 
one and 12 years after the programme began. This averaging obscures some information pertaining 
to the timing of the caseload effects. For example, most of the studies tend to suggest that 
programme effects on caseloads initially grow and then either level off or diminish.
Table 2.4 indicates that the net effect of mandatory welfare-to-work programmes on caseload size 
is negative, implying that they increase exits from the welfare rolls or deter entry onto the rolls or 
both. This is consistent with one goal of these programmes, which is to reduce caseloads. In general, 
mandatory programmes should increase the exit of current recipients from the rolls, while also 
deterring entry onto the welfare rolls, unless they provide training that individuals feel will increase 
their future earnings. 
15 Estimates for exit effects were reported in different units across the studies. Therefore, we only 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The findings for caseload size for voluntary programmes are mixed. The ODP and the Washington 
State FIP appear to have increased the size of the AFDC caseload,16 while the Massachusetts 
ET Choices Program seemed to have decreased the size of the caseload.17 This ambiguity is not 
surprising. As discussed above, voluntary programmes should have a positive entry effect, but they 
could cause exits from the existing caseload to either decrease (as welfare recipients stay on the 
rolls to participate in training activities) or increase (as recipients become more job ready).
Numerous studies have utilised individual-level data to estimate the effects of welfare-to-work 
programmes on the receipt of welfare. Because many of these studies cover only individuals who are 
on welfare at the time the programmes began, the effects on welfare receipt are often interpreted 
as effects on welfare exit. Only three studies have directly examined exit effects from welfare using 
aggregate caseload data. Findings from Johnson, Klepinger, and Dong’s (1992) study of a voluntary 
programme in Oregon indicate that exits decreased, perhaps because welfare recipients remained 
on the rolls longer in order to complete their training (a ‘locking-in effect’). Estimates from Schiller 
and Brasher’s (1992) study of a mandatory programme in Ohio, suggest, as anticipated, that exits 
from AFDC increased, although this increase in exits was partially offset by an increase in welfare 
applications. Findings from Chang’s (1996) evaluation of a mandatory programme in West Virginia 
were ambiguous.
Five aggregate-level time series studies have directly examined entry effects by looking at whether 
applications for welfare increase or decrease as a result of a welfare-to-work programme, although 
the value of the empirical results is reduced by their sensitivity to model specification changes. All 
five studies compare welfare application rates in sites that have a welfare-to-work programme 
with application rates in sites that do not have the programme. Three of the five studies are 
consistent with expectations that voluntary programmes for welfare recipients encourage entry 
onto the welfare rolls and mandatory programmes discourage entry. Of the two studies of voluntary 
programmes, Johnson, Klepinger, and Dong (1992) find that a voluntary programme in Oregon 
had a positive entry effect, but Wissoker and Watts (1994) do not find a positive entry effect for a 
voluntary programme in the state of Washington. Of the three studies of mandatory programmes, 
two indicate, as anticipated, that entry effects were negative (Chang 1996, and Phillips 1993), while 
the remaining study finds no evidence of a negative entry effect, along with a much larger increase 
in exits (Schiller and Brasher, 1992).
In addition to the five studies just discussed, there are two studies of entry effects that are not listed 
in Table 2.4. The first of these (Card and Robins, 2005) is not listed because it does not examine 
effects on welfare applications. Instead, it looks at the effects of a demonstration programme, 
Canada’s Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), on persons in British Columbia and New Brunswick who had 
already applied for welfare. SSP provided generous financial incentive payments to these persons if 
they remained on the welfare rolls for over a year after the programme began and then took a job in 
which they worked at least 30 hours a week. The supplement was equal to one-half the difference 
between a ‘target’ earnings level (initially $37,000 in 2007 Canadian dollars in British Columbia 
and $30,000 in New Brunswick) and an individual’s earnings. Because the income individuals 
could receive if they worked at least 30 hours was much larger under SSP than under welfare, the 
programme provided a strong monetary incentive to leave welfare and work full time. The analysis is 
based on a random assignment experiment that was specifically designed to determine the extent 
16 The very large positive estimate for 2-parent families under the Washington State FIP is 
probably because this programme greatly liberalised the standards these families had to meet 
to qualify for AFDC. The rules were not similarly liberalised for 1-parent families.
17 The findings of O’Neill (1990) suggest that after the first year, the voluntary ET Choices 
Program may have had a small positive effect on AFDC caseloads.
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to which welfare applicants extended their welfare stay in order to become eligible for the financial 
incentives – that is, to enter SSP. The results indicate that there was a three percentage point rise in 
the fraction of welfare applicants who remained on the welfare rolls for at least a year. The study 
authors conjecture that because the entry effect on those who already applied for welfare was so 
modest and the cost and stigma of newly applying for welfare are appreciable, it is unlikely that the 
SSP incentives would encourage more than a negligible number of additional welfare applications. 
The SSP experiment arguably provides the best available information on the entry effects of 
programmes intended to encourage employment. 
Moffitt (1996) illustrated entry effects for voluntary and mandatory programmes using a 
micro-simulation model. This study was excluded from Table 2.4 because it is not based on 
real programme data. Moffitt’s estimates, which are often sizable, suggest that a mandatory 
programme for AFDC recipients with a heavy participation time requirement would reduce entry into 
welfare, while a voluntary programme would increase entry. Much of the latter effect, however, is 
attributable to an assumption that training provided by the programme would reduce the stigma 
attached to welfare receipt, rather than from the training itself.
It does not appear very feasible to directly account for entry effects in conducting CBAs of 
employment and training programmes for benefit recipients. Although there is evidence that 
voluntary programmes encourage entry, while mandatory programmes deter entry, the magnitude 
of entry effects seems likely to be driven by the specific details of the design of the programme 
being evaluated. Moreover, the empirical evidence on entry effects is quite sketchy and all of it is 
limited to programmes located in North America. However, the likely direction and importance of 
entry effects should be discussed in reporting cost-benefit findings of employment and training 
programmes for benefit recipients.
 
Although empirical information about entry effects is insufficient for sensitivity tests, their likely 
direction and importance should be discussed in reporting cost-benefit findings of employment 
and training programmes for benefit recipients.
2.5 Conclusions
In this section, we briefly list our key conclusions about how various general equilibrium effects 
should be treated in conducting CBAs of employment and training programmes.
•	 In	conducting	sensitivity	analyses	of	demand-side	employment	and	training	programmes,	60	
per cent can reasonably be used as an upper bound value of the substitution effect and 30 per 
cent as a lower bound value. In principle, this sensitivity test should take account of displacement 
effects that result from wage subsidy programmes, as well as substitution effects resulting from 
such programmes. However, in reporting the sensitivity results for public sector programmes, it 
should be emphasised that while econometric estimates suggest the substitution effect might be 
as large as 60 per cent, or even larger, findings from the survey approach imply that they could be 
smaller than 30 per cent. Moreover, even if the substitution effect was initially as large as 60 per 




upper bound value of the substitution effect and zero as the lower bound value, while cautioning 
readers that findings based on general equilibrium models, which imply much larger substitution 
effects, are being ignored. However, because it is so difficult to draw plausible conclusions 
from existing evidence concerning the size of substitution effects that result from supply-side 
programmes, it might be better to forego sensitivity analyses for substitution effects in conducting 
CBAs of such programmes. Instead, readers of the studies can simply be cautioned about the 
possible existence of substitution effects by briefly reviewing the evidence presented in Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 of this report.
•	 In	cost-benefit	studies	of	employment	and	training	employment	programmes,	base-case	
estimates should be first derived by assuming that there is no effect on wages. Sensitivity tests of 
the base-case for large-scale demand-side programmes might then be conducted by assuming 
that there is a small increase in wages of (say) one or two per cent. Similar sensitivity tests for 
supply-side programmes do not seem appropriate because the evidence concerning these effects 
is too weak.
•	 Although	empirical	information	exists	about	entry	effects,	it	is	insufficient	for	conducting	
sensitivity tests. Instead, the likely direction and importance of entry effects should be discussed 
in reporting cost-benefit findings of employment and training programmes.
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3 Subgroup impacts 
In this chapter we consider how to account for the fact that the net impact on employment 
might vary among sub-groups. We further consider a closely related topic: the possibility that the 
distribution of impacts varies and is not satisfactorily represented by the mean impact. These topics 
are not currently addressed by the cost-benefit framework. 






variables such as earnings (quantiles)18. For example, for a programme, the impacts for those 
in the lowest earnings may differ from the impacts for those at the highest earnings, and the 
impacts	for	both	groups	may	be	different	from	the	programme’s	impact	at	the	mean;	or	for	two	
different programmes which have the same average effect, for one programme the effects may 
be concentrated at the lower end of the earnings distribution while for the other programme the 
effects may be concentrated at the higher end. 
In this chapter, we provide guidance on how to conduct benefit-cost analysis for each of these  
three cases. 
3.1 Subgroups
In estimating the impacts of training and employment programmes, analysts usually focus on the 
overall population of programme participants. However, they also estimate programme impacts 
on subgroups of these persons. Subgroup analysis is often of interest regardless of the finding for 
the overall programme impact. On the one hand, if the overall impact is positive and statistically 
significant, then it seems appropriate to focus resources on those most helped. On the other hand, if 
the overall impact is not statistically significant, then subgroup analysis may be used to see whether 
there are some persons who are nevertheless helped. Additionally, there may be a ‘hard to help’ 
group which is of particular interest – for such a group, a subgroup impact would better assess how 
the programme meets the needs of this group. When estimated programme effects appear to differ 
among subgroups, separate cost benefit analyses (CBAs) for each subgroup is a natural next step. 
This is sometimes done, but not always.
Subgroups may be defined in numerous ways, which will, of course, vary depending on the 
programme being examined. The list below illustrates some of the more important subgroup 




18 In this context quantiles are subgroupings – points taken at regular intervals from the 
distribution of an outcome variable, such as the earnings distribution – hence, there can be 









Important informative subgroups can be formed not only from individual characteristics, but from 
programme delivery aspects or variations in cost. For example, in the New Deal for Disabled People 
(NDDP) cost benefit analysis (CBA), a key subgroup was formed by job-broker size (Greenberg and 
Davis, 2007). This example is discussed below in Section 3.2.1. 
Subgroups based on individual characteristics, such as employment status and benefit status are 
typically defined on the basis of status prior to programme entry so as not to introduce endogeneity 
into the analysis. This avoids the problem that occurs with subgroups defined for these variables 
after programme entry, where something related to the changes in employment/benefit status from 
the start of programme entry/eligibility and hence the subgroup definition have caused the impact 
observed in the analysis. Sometimes, however, endogeneity cannot be avoided because the analysis 
is directly concerned with whether a programme causes people to move from one subgroup to 
another – for example, from being non-employed and on benefits to being employed and off 
benefits. As seen in Section 3.2.2, such topics can be examined in a way that does not bias the analysis. 
Although analyses of programme impacts are usually most concerned with average effects (that 
is, with effects on a typical member of the programme group), sometimes there is also an interest 
in how programme effects are distributed among the programme group – for example, on whether 
programme impacts are distributed fairly evenly among programme participants or concentrated 
upon relatively few participants, with effects on the remaining participants small or absent. 
•	 There	may	be	a	group	which	is	of	particular	interest.	If	so,	a	subgroup	impact	can	assess	
whether the programme meets the needs of this group.
•	 When	estimated	programme	effects	appear	to	differ	among	the	subgroups,	separate	 
CBAs for each subgroup may then be conducted, although this is not always done.
•	 Subgroup	definitions	must	be	carefully	defined	for	analysis	to	avoid	the	technical	analytical	
problems of endogeneity.
In the remainder of this section, we first examine the relevance of subgroup impacts for CBA. We 
then discuss some problems and issues that arise in examining subgroup impacts. We end with a 
discussion of estimating the distribution of impacts over programme participants.
3.2 Relevance of subgroup impacts for cost benefit analyses
As indicated above, when separate impacts are estimated for different subgroups, separate CBAs are 
sometimes also conducted for each subgroup. Although this is done fairly frequently, it is obviously 
practical to do it for only a limited number of subgroups. Moreover, not all of the information needed 
for the CBA may exist separately by subgroup. For example, programme operating cost information 
by subgroup needs to be available for a full CBA by subgroup. Knowledge of key subgroups of interest 





This last point is illustrated by a CBA of the NDDP, a voluntary programme that attempted to 
increase employment among Incapacity Benefit claimants (Greenberg and Davis, 2007). The 
NDDP programme was delivered locally by Job Brokers, which were a mixture of public sector, 
private sector, and charitable organisations. In conducting the cost benefit analysis of the NDDP 
programme, Greenberg and Davis (2007) provided separate findings for claimants that registered 
at small Job Brokers and those that registered at large Job Brokers. This seemed important because 
there was evidence that NDDP was more costly to operate at small Job Brokers than at large Job 
Brokers and that NDDP reduced the incapacity benefits received by registrants at small Job Brokers 
by more than it reduced the incapacity benefits received by registrants at larger Job Brokers. 
Separate CBAs were also conducted for claimants that were already receiving incapacity benefits 
when NDDP began operating (stock of claimants) and those that began receiving benefits after 
operations commenced (flow of new/repeat claimants), as NDDP appeared to have larger impacts 
on the earnings and the receipt of benefits of the first subgroup than on the second. In this case, 
full CBAs were not possible because while separate estimates of impacts on earnings and benefit 
receipt were available for the two subgroups of interest, separate estimates of programme operating 
costs were not. Thus, it was necessary to assume that operating costs were the same for the two 
subgroups.
3.2.2 Work/benefit outcomes
The CBA of the Pathways to Work programme (Adam et al., 2008), which, like the NDDP, was 
intended to encourage employment among Incapacity Benefit claimants, used subgroup analysis 
for a very different purpose. In this case, the programme sample was divided into the following six 






6 not employed, receiving incapacity benefits.
An impact analysis was first used to estimate the percentage of the programme sample that would 
be in each subgroup with and without the Pathways programme, with the difference between the 
two being a measure of the impact of the programme. Then, based on the average earnings and 
the distribution of earnings within each subgroup, the Institute for Fiscal Studies micro-simulation 
model was used to predict the amount of various benefits (e.g. incapacity benefits, housing benefits, 
council tax benefits, and tax credits) that would be received and taxes (e.g. income taxes and 
employee and employer national insurance contributions) that would be paid by the persons in each 
subgroup in the absence of the programme and with the programme. The difference in each case 
provided a measure of a programme benefit or cost. This approach may well be unique to the CBA 
of the Pathways to Work programme. Impacts on benefit and tax payment amounts are more often 
determined in CBA for a single ‘representative’ (i.e. average) member of the programme group that 
is observed to move from the programme into employment. Unlike the Pathways’ CBA, however, this 
approach does not incorporate important non-linearities in the tax and benefit system, and thus 
may result in biased estimates. 
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3.3 Key issues in estimating subgroup impacts
3.3.1 Statistical significance, sufficient sample size and intrinsic  
 differences between the groups or they were treated differently  
 under the programme?
Several important issues arise in estimating impacts for separate subgroups and thus in 
subsequently using these estimates in CBAs. First, although the sample used in an impact analysis 
may be large enough to detect overall programme impacts, once broken into subgroups the 
resulting smaller subsamples may produce a finding of non-significance for particular subgroups 
when a true difference exists. 
Second, a statistically significant impact for a particular subgroup may occur because of chance 
alone. This becomes increasingly likely as the number of subgroups that are examined increase. To 
minimise this problem, it is important to test whether programme impacts on different subgroups 
differ significantly from one another, not just whether the individual impacts are statistically 
significant. Testing whether subgroup differences are statistically significant reduces the possibility 
of obtaining false positive or false negative findings. It is important to recognise, however, that 
although significance tests can be performed for programme impacts on earnings and benefits, 
which are estimated for samples of individuals, this is rarely possible for programme operating costs 
unless different programme participants are assigned to different service delivery organisations. 
The CBA of the NDDP programme, which was mentioned above, is an important exception because 
services were delivered by a number of different Job Brokers – however, the sample size was very 
small (19 Job Brokers).
Third, it is often unclear as to whether differences in programme impacts on different subgroups 
are attributable to intrinsic differences between the groups or because they were treated differently 
under the programme. For example, a difference in impacts on earnings between programme 
participants with and without previous work experience may result if a welfare-to-work programme 
provides help in job search for the former and vocational training for the latter. This difference in 
impacts might or might not have resulted had the two subgroups received the same services. Where 
differences in subgroup impacts are produced and found, it is important to explore the delivery of 
services to these subgroups to help understand whether the subgroup impacts are attributable 
to intrinsic differences between the groups or because they were treated differently under the 
programme. This is especially important if the programme being examined can be described as a 
‘black box’ or a ‘bundle of potential services’.  
•	 It	is	important	to	test whether programme impacts on different subgroups differ 
significantly from one another using statistical tests, not just whether the individual impacts 
are statistically significant.
•	 When	significant	differences	in	subgroup	impacts	are	found,	it	is	important	to	explore	
the delivery of services to these subgroups to help understand if the subgroup impacts 
are attributable to intrinsic differences between the groups or because they were treated 
differently under the programme.
•	 Significance	tests	are	rarely	possible	for	programme	operating	costs.	However,	there	are	
exceptions, and so this possibility should always be explored.
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3.3.2 Confirmatory versus Exploratory subgroup analyses
To minimise problems in subgroup analysis, it is very helpful to define the subgroups that are to 
be investigated before the evaluation begins. Ideally, this should be based on a theory as to why 
differences in programme impacts on these subgroups are anticipated and what the directions 
and magnitudes of the differences are likely to be. This helps reduce the number of subgroups that 
are analysed, thereby minimising the possibility of erroneously finding a statistically significant 
difference between subgroups when a true difference does not exist. Moreover, it makes it possible 
to collect data on subsamples that are of sufficient size for each relevant subgroup so that 
statistically significant impacts can be estimated. With insufficient sized subsamples, the possibility 
of a false finding of statistically non-significant differences among subgroups is higher. Subgroups to 
be investigated should be defined at the outset of the evaluation and based on data information for 
the population defined at programme eligibility point.19
 
Subgroups to be investigated should be defined at the outset of an evaluation. 
To conduct a CBA for subgroup impacts requires that data on costs be collected for these subgroups.
3.3.3 Use all subgroup analyses with caution
Findings from the sort of ‘confirmatory’ subgroup analysis just described should be treated with 
considerable caution, even when the differences between the impacts for different subgroups are 
statistically significant. Findings from an ‘exploratory’ subgroup analysis in which differences among 
subgroups are investigated on an ad hoc basis after the overall programme impact is estimated 
should be treated with much greater caution. This is particularly important when the overall impact 
of a programme is statistically non-significant and there is great temptation to try to discover a 
subgroup for which the programme ‘works’. Caution is needed because, as set out in Section 3.3.2, 
the statistical inference is affected by whether a confirmatory or an exploratory subgroup analysis 
is conducted – the statistical inference for confirmatory subgroup analyses is more reliable and 
informative, and hence superior to exploratory subgroup analyses. 
3.4 Programme effects on the distribution of the outcome
The discussion so far regards how mean impacts might differ across various subgroups of participant 
types. This section discusses how impacts might differ across subgroups of the outcome variable. 
This is usually of particular relevance for continuous variables, such as earnings, which have a 
distribution of values, and the impact at the average may not be the only point of interest. 
3.4.1 The current evaluation evidence of average effects informing DWP cost  
 benefit analyses
Distributional effects are particularly important in the context of social policies, as these are often 
directed at particular targets which reflect only a part of the distribution – such as low earners 
(not all earners) in order to reduce poverty. An example for such policies is the recent Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration, which in particular aimed to improve the 
situation of low income earners. 
19 This can mean that administrative data is the main source for subgroup information in order 
to provide population information, rather than potentially selected (and hence subject to bias) 




Surprisingly, even the ERA programme has so far only been evaluated in terms of the mean 
effectiveness on earnings (Dorsett et al., 2007), although this mean effect is likely to differ from the 
effects for low earners or for high earners. In such cases, the estimation of programme effects for 
particular distribution subgroups (or quantiles20) is more informative – continuing with the example 
about a programme targeting low earners, low earners might be defined as those with earnings in 
the bottom 25 per cent of the distribution of earnings, and the quantile impact at this point may 
differ from the mean impact. 
3.4.2 Quantile treatment effects
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) point out that quantile regression models ‘…characterise the 
heterogeneous impact of variables on different points of an outcome distribution’. In other words, 
they can be used to reveal whether the impacts differ across the outcome distribution subgroups. 
Distributional effects are in particular important in the context of some welfare-to-work reforms 
as they may improve the situation of a particular set of workers in the low segment of the wage 
distribution as they aim at reducing poverty. 
Other applications of quantile treatment effects could consider differential effects on particular 
segments of the distribution of unemployment duration, providing equally important evidence on 
the policy, e.g. how job seekers at different points in the distribution of unemployment duration are 
affected by a policy. 
When focusing on mean impact, the distributional effects of programmes remain unidentified, 
and may result in the CBA informing about an average negative outcome, which may in fact 
consist of positive and negative outcomes for different quantiles along a particular distribution of 
unemployment or previous benefit duration. Ultimately, disregarding quantile treatment effects may 
result in factually inadequate advice about the provision of policies for these groups. This is because 
the evaluation evidence does not inform about the group for whom the programme was targeted.
 
Quantile treatment impacts for earnings or duration may be needed if the programme is 
targeted at (or might be desired to be targeted at) particular subgroups of earnings or duration. 
3.4.3 Previous quantile treatment effects empirical evidence
The effects of training on the lower part of the earnings distribution can be more interesting for 
policy makers than the effect at upper quantiles as an explicit objective of many programmes is 
to reduce poverty for the low-wage groups. There is no existing evidence that we know of on the 
importance of such heterogeneity of treatment effects for the United Kingdom. 
Internationally, Firpo (2007) shows that some programme effects can vary with the quantiles of 
the earnings distribution – Firpo(2007:39) reanalysed the Dehija and Wahba (1999) Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID)21 experimental data for the United States’ National Supported Work 
Programme and found negative effects of the programme for the extreme upper parts of the 
20 In this context, quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the distribution of an 
outcome variable, such as the earnings distribution. Some quantiles have special names and 
are more commonly used: the 2-quantile is called the median which is also a key measure 
of	central	tendency;	the	10-quantiles	are	called	deciles,	which	are	often	used	in	income	
distribution	literature;	the	100-quantiles	are	called	percentiles.
21 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample 




the programme on the treated was $1,740, substantially positive and statistically significant. Firpo 
was also able to use quantile treatment effects to calculate the median impact on the treated, and 
this was $1,927 – for distributions, the mean and the median are two different measures of central 
tendency, and for earnings, the median is usually preferred as the measure of the centre of the 
distribution as the median is not influenced upwards by high value outliers at the upper end of the 
distribution;	in	this	case,	the	mean	and	median	impact	were	relatively	close	suggesting	the	centre	of	
the distribution was satisfactorily represented by the average. 
Other applications estimating quantile treatment effects focus on quantiles of particular durations 
(e.g. the duration of unemployment or the duration of benefit receipt). Lalive (2007) estimates the 
impact of a reform of Austrian unemployment benefits for those with extremely long duration in the 
upper quantiles of the duration of unemployment. Koenker and Bilias (2000) also show how quantile 
treatment effects can be used to analyse duration data by re-analysing experimental data from the 
Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Experiments.
In estimating duration outcomes, all studies face the difficulty of estimating quantile treatment 
effects for right-censored durations, as unemployment spells may still continue and so standard 
estimators are generally not consistent and Censored Quantile Regression algorithms must be used 
(Powell 1986). 
Econometric methods for applying quantile treatment effects are set out in Appendix C. 
3.4.4 Recommendation for quantile treatment effects for some programmes
A number of DWP programmes could be assessed for quantile treatment effects as they might 
affect particular parts of the wage or benefit duration distributions differently. The results of such 
analyses can inform decisions regarding which groups of the population to target for programme 
access in the future. 
Applications of these methods are arguably most appropriate when a particular part of an outcome 
distribution (of earnings or benefit duration) was the desired target of a programme.
For example, the DWP programme ERA was designed to improve job retention and career 
advancement prospects for Britain’s low-wage workforce (i.e. some lower part of the distribution).
Therefore, for ERA, the quantile treatment effects of earnings are likely to be the main effects of 
interest for policy makers. 
The DWP programme Pathways to Work could be another example, as this could be re-examined 
with regards to the impact on Incapacity Benefit (IB) durations. The approach taken by Lalive (2007) 
could be followed as the programme introduction also mimics a natural experiment (with pilot/
non-pilot areas, etc.). For Pathways to Work, it would be interesting to investigate the impact of 
the programme on long-term IB claimants or on particular quantiles of the distribution of benefit 
durations. However, since Pathways to Work was not randomly assigned and the rollout areas in the 
programme design were not randomly assigned, controlling for selection effects in an econometric 
model could be quite complicated. 
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4 Duration of benefits and 
 employment, wages, and  
 multiple participation
4.1 Duration/sustainability currently used in DWP cost benefit  
 analysis
For some cost benefit analyses (CBAs) of employment and training programmes conducted 
internally in the Department for Work and Pensions, estimates of the employment generating effect 
of the programmes originate from studies for a particular cohort (or a stock of participants) at a 
particular date following participation and not for continuous outcomes. 
For such analyses, the point estimates of employment impact are multiplied with actual 
participation figures in order to derive an estimate of the total ‘additional jobs’ attributable to the 
intervention. To derive an estimate of the ‘total additional job years’ created by a programme an 
estimate of how long a person who obtains one of these additional jobs continues to be employed 
is also needed (see Greenberg and Knight, 2007). However, when constrained into following this 
approach, , there is often a lack of direct evidence gained from programme evaluations regarding 
the duration of post-programme employment.
Deriving estimates of average job duration from the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) 
would improve the robustness of the ex post CBAs for a number of DWP employment and training 
programmes. With the ten years of WPLS data available, some of the longer-term outcomes can be 
estimated directly for earlier introduced programmes that started near or soon after the beginning 
of the data, 1999, as these data offer continuous observations of participants and non-participants 
for a period of up to ten years, allowing the analysis of the sustainability of employment outcomes 
after the programme and the exit from benefits. For some programmes, two to five years might be 
available. More recent programmes would have less follow-up years available.  
•	 We	recommend	replacing	relatively	weak	assumptions	about	the	duration	of	a	subsequent	
job by estimating the duration of employment directly using the available information in the 
WPLS. 
•	 Ideally	these	should	be	net	impact	estimates,	where	suitable	comparison	groups	are	
identifiable and where data exists for them
Unfortunately, when using the WPLS for these purposes, substantial data processing is necessary in 
order to correct for some weaknesses in the data. For example, the employment records’ start and 
end dates have a lot of missing information. Indeed, because of this, some recent evaluations have 
used WPLS data in addition to survey data requesting detailed information from participants and 
non-participants in order to estimate the sustainability of employment effects and benefit following 
participation (see Riccio et al., 2008).
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In the following sections, we first review the estimation of programme effects for duration 
outcomes. We then turn to a number of indicators that we explore in empirical estimates. Finally, we 
suggest further empirical work which can be done. 
4.2 Models to analyse duration outcomes of social programmes
The time spent on benefit, the transition from benefit to employment and the sustainability of 
employment are variables of interest when evaluating employment and training programmes. It 
can be in particular relevant to estimate the time spent on unemployment benefit, i.e. the ‘survival 
function’ for benefit duration, as some programmes might reduce the time spent on benefit. 
There are numerous publications estimating the causal effect of programme participation on 
duration. Methods available include:
•	 modelling	with	a	parametric baseline hazard rate specification in the context of regression models 
that allow the prediction of how the survival on benefit is influenced by the participation in 
programmes;	
•	 models	that	estimate	causal	effects	on	duration	without a parametric	baseline	hazard;	and	
•	 models	evaluating	policy	effects	for	duration	outcomes,	using	one	of	these	two	approaches,	but	
within matched samples. 
4.2.1 Hazard models
Hujer et al. (1997) evaluate the effects of particular policies combining matching methods that 
control for observable characteristics with hazard models. A hazard rate is the instantaneous 
transition (e.g. from unemployment to employment) rate of one individual at a particular time per 
unit of time period. 
Hazard models allow one to evaluate the impact of particular policies on the transition from 
unemployment to employment. One can simulate hazard rates of leaving benefit separately for 
participants and non-participants. The estimated survivor function can be simulated too in order to 
show how the probability of remaining unemployed is affected by the policy.
Hazard rate approaches can also simultaneously model the transition into programmes and post-
programme outcomes and may more flexibly allow consideration of dynamic selection issues arising 
from unobserved variation in both programme participation and outcomes (Abbring and Heckman, 
2007). 
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) elaborate how, under particular assumptions, a non-parametric 
model of both transition to programme participation and outcomes can be estimated, identifying 
the causal effect of the treatment in non-experimental data as a function of observed covariates, 
general dependence and unobserved variation. 
The estimated coefficients of these models can be used to evaluate the impact of a particular policy 
on the duration of unemployment for a particular subgroup or the impact on the average duration 
of unemployment across all groups. These estimates can then be used to derive estimates of fiscal 
savings or gains that are due to the policy.
4.2.2 Matching approaches 
Hazard models are best suited to estimate policy effects on initial transitions (e.g. into employment). 
Consideration of the determinants of any later transition (e.g. back into unemployment) is typically 
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ignored. For some policy questions it may be more informative to estimate outcomes on average 
days on benefit or employment rates in particular periods following participation directly. 
In a number of previous evaluation studies, combined matching approaches with regression 
functions in matched samples have been used in order to estimate the effect on such employment 
outcomes directly (see, for example, Bergemann et al., 2009). Such models estimate individual 
cumulated treatment effects for a particular time after the beginning of a programme in matched 
samples using propensity score matching. The cumulated programme effect over time can then be 
estimated for any interval after the beginning of treatment.
4.2.3 Programme effects on post-participation time windows
Hazard models or matching in combination with hazard models are usually related to the particular 
spell following programme participation and the transition from the programme into employment. 
In order to analyse the effectiveness of programmes, it may be especially relevant to consider the 
sustainability of such outcomes. 
Since WPLS data record, in principle, employment and benefit status on a daily basis22, we can 
model sustainability of employment outcomes by analysing the time spent in employment following 
programme participation. As shown in the evaluation of the longer-term outcomes of Work-Based 
Learning for Adults (WBLA), this dataset can be used to estimate the gain in days of employment 
(Speckesser and Bewley, 2006). 
WPLS data can also allow one to estimate the average post-participation wage of both participants 
and non-participants. This would provide an estimate of the net wage effect of programmes 
and this could be incorporated in CBAs. However, a comparison group must be chosen. If there is 
uncertainty over the suitability of this comparison group, the report of the estimation results must 
indicate that they be interpreted with caution. 
Speckesser and Bewley (2006) use WPLS data to estimate a variety of long-term outcomes for the 
evaluation of WBLA. Since WPLS data are organised as spells with start and end dates, outcomes 
are recorded on a daily basis and allow both the calculation of averages in particular time intervals 
or cumulative outcomes. Depending on the cohorts chosen for the participation in particular 
programmes, we may be able to observe outcomes for many months after participation. 
As shown in Chapter 5 of the report, in which we report the gross outcomes of the various New 
Deal programmes on participants, WPLS data can be used to derive estimates to feed into CBAs. In 
combination with propensity score matching or difference-in-differences methods, the WPLS could 
be used to gain net impact estimates of the true causal employment, wage, or benefit effects of a 
programme. 
Wage and duration impacts have been estimated for some DWP programmes in the past. The 
primary obstacle to analysis is that often there is no comparison group and survey data is often 
limited because of the chosen research design of the survey. In lieu of using survey data one can use 
administrative data. As some important programme participation data are already included in WPLS 
data (e.g. the New Deals) or can be merged easily using the encrypted National Insurance numbers 
22 However, note that the WPLS does have recording issues. For example, among other issues, 
the WPLS records end dates of benefit spells only imprecisely, the self-employed are not 
included, nor are those whose income is below the taxable threshold.
Duration of benefits and employment, wages, and multiple participation
39
to other data23, the production of net programme effects on cohort-specific post-participation time 
windows would improve the quality of the assumptions that are used when conducting internal 
CBAs.
 
To help inform internal CBAs, steps should be taken to ensure that necessary estimates are 
collected in order to evaluate programmes. Ideally, net impacts for these items should be 






23 Analyses for impact of the programme on participants (treatment on the treated impact) 
require programme participation data, which might exist in one separate dataset, as well as 
employment and benefit spell data which might exist in another data set, and which can act 
as an outcome variable. These data may need to be merged on an individual level.
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5 Using administrative data  
 to inform CBF for duration of  
 benefits and employment,  
 and wages
To value many of the impacts of a programme, we first need an estimate of the total additional 
time in employment created by the programme (this is the employment that occurs as a result of 
the programme and would not occur if the programme did not exist). Second, an estimate of the 
earnings in that additional employment is needed (see Fujiwara, 2010). 
In this chapter, empirical estimates of employment and benefit duration and earnings are limited 
to New Deal programmes. This could be extended in future research where linked programme 
participation/eligibility data and benefit/employment/earnings outcome data exist. Ideally we 
would estimate net impacts on duration of benefit receipt, employment, and wages. In practice, we 
estimate only gross outcomes. Net impacts are viable for future research but the identification of a 
suitable comparison group does need to be possible. 
As there is no counterfactual, these figures do not show the programme impact.
5.1 Using administrative data for an analysis of economic   
 outcomes
Much of the information necessary to estimate the costs and benefits of the Department for 
Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) employment and training programmes can be retrieved from various 
administrative records including the eligible population for the programmes (working-age benefit 
claimants in the Master Index (MI) data), programme participants (participation databases), benefit 
outcomes (MI data), and employment outcomes (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) data).
5.2 Identification of eligible populations
The National Benefits Database (NBD) includes those personal characteristics of benefit claimants 
necessary to identify the eligible population for particular programmes. It includes information 
about benefit payments and beginning and end dates. Since most programmes are offered to 
the working-age population on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and Incapacity Benefit (IB) (or now 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)), the information from the beginning of the benefit claim 
can be used to identify those whose benefit claims surpass a given threshold and thus qualify for 
entry into programmes. 
Evaluations of current or previous programmes can use benefit spells from the NBD to identify 
eligible clients. In some programmes eligibility is determined by a combination of spell information 
and specific personal conditions. Some examples of eligibility are: those lone parents starting an 
Income Support (IS) claim conditional on the age of the youngest child qualify for the New Deal for 
Lone	Parents	(NDLP);	or	those	starting	a	new	IB/ESA	benefit	claim	due	to	long-term	illness	qualify	
for Pathways to Work (subject to selection based on the nature of the illness, and, due to the rollout 
since 2003, the individual’s location). 
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In practice, only a fraction of the eligible population participates in programmes. For example, 
only those lone parents on benefit who attend their work-focused interviews, feel work-ready, and 
actively take up the offer of additional services are observed entering the New Deal for Lone Parents. 
Therefore, the NBD data can sometimes offer the opportunity to identify eligible participants, as well 
as sometimes offering similar groups of claimants who can be used as a comparison group in a non-
experimental evaluation. In particular, programmes that have been piloted in specific areas (e.g. 
Pathways to Work) can be analysed by comparing eligible benefit claimants in pilot areas who began 
the programme with those in other areas who remained on the standard benefit. 
The NBD has been used in various evaluation studies before, such as the evaluation of Pathways  
to Work by Bewley et al. (2006) and Work-Based Learning for Adults (WBLA) by Speckesser and 
Bewley (2006). 
It should be noted, however, that the NBD has limitations, particularly with respect to available 
variables to use in analyses. Participants in voluntary programmes like WBLA are usually more 
work-ready and motivated to intensify their job search than eligible claimants who do not choose 
to participate. These differences driving participation also influence programme outcomes (i.e. the 
effect of participants’ unobservable characteristics are misattributed to the programme, inflating the 
programme’s success). The NBD data contain only a few variables that would allow one to control 
for these differences. These include: gender, age, location (postcodes), information on the youngest 
child and number of children for some benefits (both of which influence work readiness), a part-time 
work identifier for some of the benefits, and a benefit history (which may offer insights into people’s 
labour market history and work-readiness)24. 
Thomas (2008) and Dolton, Azevedo and Smith (2006) indicate that a strong characterisation of 
the benefit history can suffice for matching and similar impact methods. Administrative data alone 
has been found to be sufficient to support robust propensity score matching in evaluation of benefit 
exit and job entry (see Dolton, Azavedo and Smith, 2006) although some argue that selection issues 
and unobservables which affect the evaluation validity are not sufficiently controlled for without 
additional data from surveys (and would require randomisation of programme participation). It 
seems likely that it might be sufficient to use administrative data, and Thomas (2008) gives further 
evidence of this. However, essentially the assumption of the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) holding for unobservables cannot be proven to be met, as the only evidence must be drawn 
from observables. As a result, only randomised programme participation can produce data in which 
the observables can be said to be satisfying the CIA. The administrative data is generally considered 
to provide the most accurate evidence on benefits, and so evaluation using the administrative data 
such as the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey (WPLS) combined with the MI data can provide 
accurate estimates of programme impacts on benefit exit. However, it should be recalled that the 
employment data in the WPLS, which is supplied from HMRC records, is acknowledged to be very 
imprecisely measured, and certainly has coverage issues – these all combine to result in this data  
24 For the value of these benefit background variables in the New Deal for Lone Parents 
econometric re-analyses, see Dolton et al. (2006) and Knight et al. (2006). They have been 
shown in Dolton et al. (2006 ) to be sufficient to describe and satisfy the conditions for 
matching using the administrative data records.
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producing different measures of employment impacts25 to that found in survey measures. To 
improve employment estimates, individual survey data can help. This is not only because of the 
lack of coverage of the HMRC data for all employment, but also because important aspects of the 
employment such as hours of work are not present. As such, the NBD can be a reasonably powerful 
resource for evaluating pilot programmes’ effects on benefits but would usually benefit from 
additional data to enable evaluations to produce the full set of impacts on a range of outcomes of 
interest beyond benefit exit. 
Table B.1 summarises the available socio-economic indicators and benefit data which can be 
retrieved from the NBD. Most of these indicators can also be found in MI data, which are an extract 
of the NBD for the working-age population on particular benefits. The information is the same as for 
the NBD, but excludes pensioners’ benefits.
5.3 Identification of benefit outcomes
Data on benefit histories is available in the NBD. As illustrated in Table B.2 beginning and end dates 
of benefit spells allow us to estimate benefit receipt following programme participation. Some 
assumptions must be made to use this data, for the following reasons:
• benefit spells have imputed end dates. End dates are imputed as a date between benefit register 
scans (between two to six week intervals depending on the benefit) and since imputation is 
random, and carried out for all cases, it is unlikely to result in any bias. The start date of the claim 
is	known;
• some information, like the destination on leaving benefits, is not consistently included because it 
is currently only (partially) recorded for ending a JSA benefit spell.
Despite these two caveats, overall the NBD can be used to give reasonable estimates of programme 
outcomes including the benefit levels of participants, and net impacts (due to the comparison with 
non-participants26) and for some programmes based on JSA benefits, the destination on leaving 
benefit. One can use these estimates in cost benefit analyses (CBAs). Furthermore the estimates can 
be continuously updated using the NBD.
 
While descriptive evidence on gross outcomes from the NBD, such as those estimated here, 
can improve cost benefit estimates, net programme impacts would be more beneficial. 
However, estimating net impacts is more difficult since a comparison group must be identified. 
A comparison group can be non-participating benefit claimants with similar characteristics, or 
those not eligible for a programme due to living in a non-pilot area, for example. 
25 The Pathways to Work evaluation projects, Bewley et al.,	2009a;	Bewley	et al.,	2009b;	and	
Employment Retention and Advancement evaluation project reports, Dorset et al., 2007, 
Riccio et al., 2008, had both survey and administrative data-based impacts, and there were 
reasonably smaller employment estimates from the administrative data which, aside from 
non-response to surveys, was attributed largely to the fact that the employment in the HMRC 
records is limited to that collected for National Insurance and tax reasons, and so only covers 
those eligible to pay these, and also is only recorded intermittently when employers send 
forms, often with long lags. The issue is not entirely resolved.
26 However, the comparison with non-participants needs to be identified as suitable and similar 
to the programme group.




In estimating and reporting net impacts, it is important to explain the reasons for choosing a 
comparison group, in order to help establish the validity of this group as suitable and relevant 
for the evaluation design. 
It is recommended that in the establishment of a new policy, careful design for a pilot should 
take place and include a design for the evaluation which enables identification of a net impact. 
In the absence of a pilot, included in the design of the policy should be an evaluation design 
which enables net impacts and consideration of value for money for the policy programme 
to be established. In discussing a planned policy, an explanation of the considerations made 
in this design should be made, and such an explanation is also needed in the case where a 
decision is made not to establish an evaluation design for a policy, together with discussion of 
the implications this has for identifying the net impacts and value for money for the policy.
5.4 Identification of wage and employment outcomes
The employment data used for this analysis are taken from HMRC tax records for earnings from 
employment. Data documentation reports that the data were collected January 2004 through 
June 2009 although some spells begin as early as the 1970s. For most programmes, of the 
individuals observed in various programme databases, approximately 20 per cent of the cases had 
no employment records (among New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus (ND25+) participants 19 per 
cent had no employment records, 19 per cent in New Deal for individuals aged 50 plus (ND50+), 21 
per cent in NDLP, 20 per cent in New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP), 28 per cent in New Deal for 
Partners (NDP), and 22 per cent in New Deal for Young People (NDYP)). For cross tabulations included 
in this report, we assume that those without employment records were not working27.
Approximately 0.9 per cent of those individuals (on the programmes analysed in this report over the 
calendar time period considered) with employment records had an unusually high level of spells 
with more than ten recorded spells after recoding overlapping and duplicated spells. Any spells 
beyond the tenth spell were ignored. 
Earnings data were taken from the P14 file for May 2009. These data included total taxable pay 
for 2005-2009 tax years. The final year of data, 2009, reports annual earnings, assuming current 
income streams are maintained, as the records are not necessarily complete for that period yet. 
Earnings data could not be matched to employment spells, as earnings are reported for taxation 
purposes in an annual format and are aggregate across jobs. As with employment data, earnings 
were retained only for programme participants for these analyses. Fewer participants are recorded in 
the earnings data compared to in the employment data: overall, regardless of employment records, 
44 per cent of the ND25+ participants had no earning/income records, 29 per cent of ND50+, 34 per 
cent of NDLP, 25 per cent of NDDP, 44 per cent NDP, and 25 per cent of NDYP participants. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the distribution of missing labour market records for the New Deal programmes. 
Many cases have employment data without earnings data, but also a few cases have earnings data 
without employment data. This arises from the separate recording of earnings and employment in 
the databases, drawn from different administrative tax forms P45 and P14. As illustrated in Table 
5.1, in the ND25+ programme among those with earnings records (column) only one per cent do 
not have employment records, while among those with employment records (row) 55 per cent 
27 The HMRC employment data coverage is not complete and has known deficiencies which 
mean that this is not precisely true, as those with employment that does need payment of 
National Insurance or tax is not included, nor is self-employment, for example, while some of 
the information is also poor quality with regard to start and end date of the employment.
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have earnings records. Note that the data used for this analysis include the interpolations and 
assumptions outlined in the next section – the raw data would have had more missing records.
Table 5.1 Missing labour market data among programme participants
Earnings records Earnings records















Do not exist 1% 19% Do not exist 2% 17%
Earnings records Earnings records















Do not exist 0% 21% Do not exist 3% 17%
Earnings records Earnings records















Do not exist 0% 23% Do not exist 0% 23%
Notes: For example, of individuals observed in ND25+, 54.75 per cent are observed to have at least one HMRC 
employment record, with at least one earnings record. Appendix B lists variables and databases sourced for 
these analyses, while Appendix D lists the DWP database information resources. HMRC employment data 
January 2004–June 2009 (spells can start before 2004).
5.5 Identification of programme participation
A variety of programmes have separate databases with more detailed information on programme 
participation and some individual characteristics of programme participants28. These were defined 
at the outset of the programme for evaluation purposes, drawing specific variables from the Labour 
Market System (LMS) and sometimes creating new LMS variables, which were extracted into this 
database29.
28 Individual characteristics are collected differently for different programmes and coverage (the 
level of missing information) can be very high.
29 Such programme databases are a management information tool and can be devised but can 
also be limited by the time required to plan and setup such databases and the strong limitations 
on alterations to the LMS data-capture system. Such data are not always well recorded due to 
the need for caseworkers to enter the data which may not always be prioritised.
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While NBD/MI data allows one to identify a programme’s eligible population, these programme-
specific datasets show only the actual programme participants. In these datasets there are 
different indicators for when an individual’s participation on a programme begins. This is illustrated 
in Table 5.2. In most programmes the variable cdpstart corresponds to the earliest action taken 
on the programme – usually the date the participant’s benefit data details were uploaded to the 
caseworker’s system. Due to the differences in the programme designs of the various New Deals, 
some programmes do not include cdpstart or cdpstart indicates some other event, such as the 
beginning of the Gateway30 (gwstdt). 
Table 5.2 indicates the different start date variables that could be used. While the earliest start does 
not fully indicate active programme participation, the simple initiation of a case can also generate 
an employment outcome. For example if the caseworker contacts the benefit claimant with an 
invitation for a work-focused interview for a New Deal programme, the beneficiary may take a job 
or end their benefit claim rather than attend the meeting. Most programme effects will arise from 
actual participation, which can be measured using other start dates such as those indicating that 
the individual attended an initial interview, started the gateway phase of the programme, or began 
an option31. A priori it cannot be answered whether a broader or narrower definition of programme 
participation is more appropriate. Therefore we present results using multiple start dates. All 
empirical analysis using these data should carefully consider and define the start and end dates of 
programme participation that they use.
Table 5.2 shows the three start dates that were used for each programme. For example, for ND25+ 
we used cdpstart (the file upload date), gwstdt (when the client began ‘gateway’), and nd1intdt 
(when the individual attended their first interview). The last row in Table 5.2 indicates which of these 
three variables we would suggest using for each given programme as the ‘preferred’ start date. 
Unfortunately, there is little information on the reliability of the recording of these programme data 
sourced from the LMS, nor on the relative reliability, definition or coverage of each variable. 
30 See footnote 30 on the design of the New Deals: ‘Gateway’ was a period of caseworker 
services. Hence this is the ‘caseload’ date, at which this case became part of a caseworker’s 
workload
31 The New Deal programmes were designed with an initial period (of varying length depending 
on the specific New Deal programme group), called a Gateway, with caseworker services 
from Jobcentre Plus, after which those still remaining could enter an ‘option’ which was 
a more specific programme service, such as the employment option, which was a wage 
subsidy, a voluntary option with links to experience in the voluntary sector, training, and the 
environmental taskforce option. For more information on the design of specific New Deal 
programmes, consult the DWP Research Report series which has reports from the programme 
evaluations for each of these programmes.
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definition start1 cdpstart cdpstart cdpstart contstdt sfrstart cpdstart
Medium 
definition start2 gwstdt casestart firintdt ibstd ndpintat gwstd
Strictest 
definition start3 nd1intdt initint stcasedt cdpstart caselddt opst1
Preferred 
start ndstart nd1intdt initint cdpstart cdpstart caselddt cpdstart
Notes: Appendix B lists variables and databases sourced for these analyses, while Appendix D lists the DWP 
database information resources. Appendix D lists the database information sources – information about 
programme databases is available internally to DWP but in practice, information on content of variables is 
often limited to the labels on the variables/anecdotal/experience. 
5.6 Data processing
In impact evaluations published for DWP, data processing decisions tend to vary by evaluation 
and evaluations vary in the extent to which they report key dataset construction decisions. These 
decisions can influence the impacts estimated. Given this, in the future, evaluations should carefully 
report their data processing decisions. Ideally, the best identified methods should be replicated 
across evaluations. Scioch (2010) explores the importance of this for German evaluations using 
administrative data. 
We recommend that important processing of overlapping spells and inconsistent information in the 
benefit and employment administrative data used for evaluations should be more standardised by 
DWP. This could be done by developing basic approved syntax for this, together with a documentary 
description of the key rules recommended, and supplying this with the data. Variations to this may 
be needed, and individual evaluations should document these processing decisions. All evaluations 
should provide information about the key processing rules in appendices. This would mean that 
replications and critical review are possible. 
  
We recommend that important processing of overlapping spells and inconsistent information 
in the benefit and employment administrative data used for evaluations should be more 
standardised by DWP. This should be done by providing a basic approved syntax for this and 
a documentary description of the key rules recommended. The original data should still be 
provided together with this, as this then facilitates further understanding or improvements to 
be made to the processing over time. Data processing can influence the impacts estimated. 
All evaluations should provide information about the data processing rules in their reporting.
5.6.1 Standardising socio-economic information and programme options
Most	descriptive	variables	in	the	New	Deal	participation	data	did	not	need	further	processing;	
variables relating to gender, marital status, disability, postcode, rural residence, number of children, 
and date of birth of youngest child required no recoding. We standardised some of the descriptive 
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variables available on New Deal participation data to prepare the data for future multivariate 
analyses across programmes. There was a variety of information: all programmes had data on 
gender, start date, date of birth, ethnicity, disability status, postcode, end date, and the reason for 
leaving the programme (this particular variable exists for all but has varying degrees of missing 
data, sometimes very high, and so was considered unusable for these analyses). Some programmes 
also had data for marital status, the date of birth of youngest child, and programme options (e.g. 
basic skills training).
For example, to standardise, ethnicity was recoded into five categories: white, black, Asian, mixed, 
and missing. Most (but not all) of the New Deal programmes used the srf_eth2 variable which 
included nine racial categories. We made this information comparable to other programmes 
reporting only four racial categories, by merging together ‘black,’ ‘black- “Caribbean”,’ ‘black-African,’ 
and ‘black-Other’ into one category for black clients and by merging Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, 
and Pakistani into one Asian category. 
We attempted to include educational level for NDLP and NDYP as the original raw data reported 
having this information, but in some data sets all observations were missing entries for this variable.
Coding programme options
Coding programme options was the most difficult part of standardising the data. We created 
five categories: subsidised employment/volunteer work, basic skills training, higher skills training, 
self-employment assistance, and job readiness. Appendix B lists variables and descriptions and 
databases sourced for these analyses. See Appendix D for more information on the data items and 
data sets available at the time of research (supplied November 2008). 














Higher/occupational skills training (labelled hard skills in the graphs) includes: 
•	 ND25+:	FTE,	WBLA,	ETO,	and	Training	for	Work;
•	 NDLP:	Other	Education/Training,	SJFT,	AM	Demand	Led	Training,	European	Social	Fund	(ESF)	
Provision, ESF ILM, Nat/Prog Dev Fund, FTE, FTE training familiarisation, Careers, LSC Occ Training, 
and	LSC	Mod	App	Training;	
•	 NDP	and	NDYP	required	no	recoding.











seminar, job fairs, progress to work, Environmental Task Force (ETF) (familiarisation), job search 





We also standardised the variables indicating why individuals left the programme. These codes were 
simplified to indicate whether an individual left the programme for employment, another benefit, 
the same benefit, or another reason32. For some programmes the original data sometimes specified 
whether the individual left the programme for full-time or part-time work, self employment, or was 
no longer eligible.33
Overall, the data were rather limited with regards to socio-demographic covariates. The final dataset 
included: gender, age, ethnicity, rural, disability status, and for some individuals, information about 
the children. 
5.6.2 Correction of earnings and employment data from HMRC
Overlapping spells in HMRC data on earnings/employment
The original HMRC employment data included a new spell for each time any information about an 
individual changed – for example their home address. These spells had to be merged into single 
spells for these analyses. In addition, since we are generally interested in whether an individual is 
employed, not whether they maintain the same job, it was assumed that consecutive job spells are 
only one employment spell. 
If one spell lasted exactly the same time period as another or was entirely embedded in the other, 
the smaller of the two spells was ignored. Two spells were merged together to make one longer 
spell if the spells overlapped or were within seven days of each other34. If there was a gap exceeding 
seven days between any two employment spells, they were considered independent spells. It 
is worth noting that the process of merging does not only look at pairs of subsequent spells in 
32 Other reasons usually relate to inactive or jobsearch states but not on the benefit.
33 While this variable was not used in the current analysis, we recoded it with the intent of using 
it in future multivariate analyses.
34 An arbitrary number which was selected as reasonable for a change of employment status 
notification. All data processing rules such as this can affect the results found. This is why we 
suggest that all evaluations ensure the processing rules are made clear. 
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the data, but rather compares information from the recoded spell in the prior period to the next 
unmodified spell. This means that the following series of spells would be coded as a single spell as 
shown in Figure 5.1. 








Once the number of spells was reduced, we had to determine how many spells to include in the 
data to be merged into programme data. To determine the number of spells that were included we 
first ran the data allowing for 20 spells, finding the distribution of spells among individuals who had 
at least one employment spell. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution – 99.1 per cent of the people had 
ten or fewer spells while 99.99 per cent had 18 or fewer spells. We recoded the data in the manner 
outlined in Figure 5.1 to include a maximum of ten spells before merging employment records to 
programme data. The small number with such high spell numbers indicates that only a very small 
outlier group of individuals, potentially highly unusual, are affected by this. This means for these 
cases, the data reflects employment over the same periods but with fewer changes of employment. 
Figure 5.2 Per cent of cases with x employment spells
 
Note: HMRC employment data January 2004 –June 2009 (spells can start before 2004). 






5.6.3 Imputation of start/end dates for employment spells 
Some employment spells had missing start and end dates, or sometimes start dates were coded as 
‘Dec 31 9999,’ a value usually entered to code for the end date for the ongoing spell. Presumably, 
the person entering the raw information into the system simply mistyped this date into the start 
date field rather than the end date field. If a spell was missing both the start and end date or if the 
spell was missing the start date and the end date was Dec 31, 9999, then the missing dates could 
not be interpolated and the spell had to be dropped35.
However, if only a valid start or only a valid end date was available, then the other date could 
be interpolated using information about employment spell durations. Often the year of the end/
start of the employment spell was available, even if the exact date was not. This meant that when 
interpolating employment durations, we had to be sure to interpolate using information about 
average spell durations as well as applying a date falling in the appropriate year. 
To interpolate employment spells we use data from the complete employment spells available 
in the data and fitted the distribution of employment spell duration. We specified a gamma 
distribution and obtained the best fitting estimates for the parameters of this distribution.
  










This distribution was then used to pull a random start or end date for those spells with missing start 
or end dates. If the distribution picked a start or end date falling outside of the known year of the 
missing start or end date, the imputation code pulled another number from the distribution, and 
continued to do so until the interpolated date fell into the appropriate year. 
Figure 5.3 compares the duration of employment spells on the x axis to the per centile in the 
distribution of employment spells. For example, 800 days is about the 50th per centile spell duration. 
The dashed line indicates spells with fully observed information, while the solid line indicates spells 
that we interpolated. The similarity between the two lines shows how closely the observed and the 
interpolated data now match each other. 
35 Note that due to the format of this data analysis, employment spells were analysed as entirely 
independent of benefit spells. However, you can use other data to inform imputation: for 
example, if that case has a benefit spell at the start of the tax year, the employment spell start 
date could be imputed to fall on a date after the benefit exit spell.
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Figure 5.3 Comparing interpolated data with complete data
 
 
Figure 5.3 also shows the validity of the interpolated spell information by comparing the 
interpolation to observed spell information.
Finally, employment spell data were merged onto programme data so that we had employment 
data for participants both pre- and post-programme36. The number of spells per participant varied 
across programmes. Looking at Figure 5.4, a greater share of participants in the 50+ programmes 
had only one spell of employment. 
36 The current analysis uses only post-programme employment, but the data were compiled with 
the anticipation that future analyses would wish to control for participants’ work histories.
Note: HMRC employment data January 2004 –June 2009 (spells can start before 2004). 
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The original HMRC P14 file reported taxable earnings with one entry per job per tax year. Since there 
is unreliable information on the exact start and stop dates for each employment spell and because 
income is not spell-based but year-based, we cannot match earnings with individual employment 
spells. Instead, we merge all jobs across each year to create a variable measuring total taxable 
income across all jobs in a year. We then transposed the data for each individual, so that each 
record had one variable for taxable income for each fiscal tax year (2005-2009, April-March), for 
example total taxable earnings recorded for the tax year 2005. Spells of taxable benefit receipt were 
removed using the flag available in the data.
As described in Section 5.4, earnings were missing for about 58 per cent of the observations with 
employment spells while employment spell data were rarely missing for those with earnings data. 
Earnings data were unlikely to be missing at random – those with missing data are likely to have 
incomes falling below the tax threshold or there was some HMRC reporting issue for the employer. 
Given the bias of reported information and the preponderance of missing data we decided not 
to interpolate earnings for those individuals that had employment spells but no earnings. This 
means that all reported earnings information is limited to those who were employed, for whom the 
employer has reported tax record information to HMRC and who earned enough to be included in 
the tax records. As such, the earnings estimates are based on a non-randomly selected sample of 
the population of people under consideration37. 
37 This is important when considering analyses of the data and how to construct these validly.
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5.7 Benefit status information
5.7.1 Overlapping spells in Master Index data
More than one benefit can be paid simultaneously, meaning that there are often overlapping 
benefit spells in the data. While the distinction between some benefits is important (e.g. the JSA 
benefit requires participants to engage in structured job-search activities38), in this application we 
are interested in whether an individual claims any benefit in a specified period. In addition, some 
records in the benefit register may completely overlap with other records or result from changes in 
circumstances (e.g. address). 
Figure 5.5 illustrates how multiple spells can be found for one person in the MI data. This 
hypothetical case shows that the person has IS and IB claims, which partially overlap. At a later 
time, the same person has multiple spells of JSA benefits. Benefit data was recoded into daily status 
variables indicating whether a person was on benefit on each day between 2004 and 2009. For the 
five years analysed this results in more than 1,400 indicator variables of benefit receipt, retaining 
information of daily precision, but losing information about which benefit was paid on that particular 
day. Retaining data for all benefits for the working-age population (IS, incapacity benefits, Severe 
Disability Allowance, Invalid Care Allowance and JSA) would have required more computational 
resources. Setting up the data in this manner allows us to estimate the percentage of time spent on 
benefit or the benefit rate of participants on any day between 2004 and 2009. 
Figure 5.5 Recoding benefit data
 
 
5.8 Participation and outcomes
We analyse the benefit, employment and earnings outcomes for participants who started on the 
various New Deals in the financial year 2005-06. For benefit outcomes, the length of time between 
the start and the end date of a participant’s spell is the duration of interest. Therefore the calendar 
dates covering a spell depend on when in the financial year the spell began as well as the spell’s 
duration. 
38 The distinction is also important because IB may be paid at a higher rate than JSA, so if a 
programme causes people to move from JSA to IB this affects the net fiscal benefits.














































In this analysis, New Deal participation start dates range from 6 April 2005 to 5 April 2006 and 
spells are observed for a maximum of 24 months after their start date. Given this, the latest possible 
observed benefit (or employment) outcome for a start occurs in April 2008. Figure 5.6 illustrates this 
and shows how benefit outcomes and starting dates of the programme correspond. In the empirical 
work we consider outcomes at three, six, 12, 18, and 24 months following participation. 




The moving observation window allows an exact alignment of outcome to particular dates of 
participation. This is analytically preferable compared to outcomes that are related to particular 
calendar time dates.39
 
In this report, we analyse the outcomes for participants only. Although this is not causal 
evidence, it at least informs assumptions on duration of benefit or the length of employment 
after the programme participation using empirically observed post-programme benefit and 
employment rates. We recommend using these estimates for CBAs where needed.
5.9 Descriptive analysis: duration of benefits, employment,  
 and earnings
5.9.1 Extraction of participants’ cohorts
As discussed in Section 5.5, there are often multiple different types of start dates recorded for 
participants. This begins with the uploading of participant data, continuing with the first contact by 
39 If a comparison group can be created for net impacts then outcome information can be 
created for non-participants, so that net impacts on outcomes can be observed for particular 
post-programme time intervals.
Calendar time
2003 2004 2005 
Earliest participation:
06 April 2005  
Latest participation:
05 April 2006 
 
Outcome periods
2006 2007 2008 2009
+ 3 months      06/04/05–05/07/05 
+ 6 months      06/04/05–05/10/05
+ 12 months    06/04/05–05/04/06
+ 18 months    06/04/05–05/10/06
+ 24 months    06/04/05–05/04/07    
Outcome periods
+ 3 months      05/04/06–04/07/06 
+ 6 months      05/04/06–04/10/06
+ 12 months    05/04/06–04/04/07
+ 18 months    05/04/06–04/10/07
+ 24 months    05/04/06–04/04/08    
(... )
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a New Deal adviser, the beginning of the Gateway, or beginning the first option. In practice, with the 
exception of the NDDP, our results did not find much variation by the start dates we explored.40
The measured outcomes (employment, earnings and benefits three, six, nine, 12, 18 and 24 months 
after participation) depend on the chosen start date definitions. For example, expectations are 
that the proportion of spells still on benefits will be higher three months after the earliest definition 
of the starting date compared to three months after the beginning of the gateway of a New Deal 
programme. This is because there is little active programme participation in the periods immediately 
after the earliest starting date definitions. 
A small number of participants were recorded as having started the same programme twice in 
2005-06. We therefore restricted the analysis to outcomes related to the first participation41.
5.9.2 Gross benefit rates estimates
In this section, we present estimates of benefit claim rates for the programmes under consideration. 
Estimates are also presented by the programme option categories as set out in Section 5.6.1.
The observed benefit rates for the various programmes are shown in tables contained in Appendix 
A and are briefly discussed here. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate the benefit receipt ratios by time since 
programme start for four selected programmes. 
The main findings are:
•	 About	half	of	the	ND25+	participants	(who	entered	in	2005-06)	are	on	benefit	12	months	after	
starting the programme. After two years, the benefit rate is still around 42 per cent (Tables A.1 
and A.2). These results are robust to using different definitions of programme start or considering 
the total per cent of time being spent on benefit for all participants42. 
•	 For	ND50+,	one	year	after	programme	start,	43	per	cent	of	participants	are	on	benefits.	About	
one third are on benefit after two years43. Looking at the time spent on benefit as a percentage of 
the total time since beginning the programme, more than 50 per cent of the first 12 months was 
spent	on	benefit;	45	per	cent	of	time	was	spent	on	benefit	in	the	first	two	years	after	participation	
(Tables A.6 and A.7). 
•	 Voluntary	programmes,	like	the	NDLP,	with	entry	routes	through	work-focused	interviews	or	
a customer self-referral show more favourable benefit outcomes. This is not surprising as it is 
expected that more work-ready claimants will begin the programme relative to the compulsory 
programmes. For NDLP about one third of all the participants are on benefit 12 months after 
beginning the programme. Over the first year, participants spend up to 50 per cent of the time on 
benefit. (Tables A.11 and A.12).
40 For NDDP, using the IB start date variable significantly decreased the observable employment 
and made the proportion observed in subsidised employment higher than the average for all 
programmes. It also significantly increased the estimated benefit receipt rates. This possibly 
relates to the longer benefit (IB) spell lengths for NDDP volunteers relative to programmes 
based on other benefits.
41 This is the simplest best analytical practice where there is multiple participation.
42 Intensive Activity Period’ (IAP) participation is classified under ‘Job-readiness’ – see earlier 
in Section 5.6.1. IAP is variety of assistance (training, work experience etc.) lasting 13 to 52 
weeks;	it	is	the	second	stage	of	assistance	for	ND25+,	and	is	voluntary	for	ND50+.	
43 The current analysis does not include pension benefits, only working-age benefits.




25 per cent after 18 months. About 34 per cent of the first 24 months is spent on benefit (Tables 
A.16 and A.17). The preferred start date for NDDP is cdpstart (see Table 5.2).
•	 In	the	NDP	programme,	the	partners	are	usually	included	in	the	main	claimant’s	benefit	claim	
and have no separate benefit record, so the benefit rates for the ‘partners’ initially appear low. 
Over time benefit rates for the partners increase to about 12 per cent after two years, as some 
participants initiate independent claims (e.g. JSA) (Tables A.21 and A.22).
•	 Among	the	mandatory	programmes,	the	NDYP	shows	the	lowest	post-participation	benefit	rates.	
Twelve months after the start of the programme, about one third of the participants still claim 
benefits and participants spend about 38 per cent of their first year on benefit. Around 27 per cent 
of claimants are still on benefit after two years. Due to a few long-term claimants, the average per 
cent of time spent on benefit for all participants within the first 24 months is rather high at 37 per 
cent. (Tables A.26 and A.27).
Figure 5.7 Snapshot of benefit receipt for selected New Deal programmes
Note: Participants who started on the various New Deals in the financial year 2005-06. ‘hard skills 
option’=higher/occupational skills training, defined in Section 5.6.1.
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 Figure 5.8 Percentage of time spent on benefit for selected New Deal 
 Programmes up to 24 months after participation start
 
 
5.9.3 Gross employment durations 
In this section, we present estimates of employment entry for the various programmes under 
consideration. Estimates are also presented for each programme by the programme option 
categories as set out in Section 5.6.1. 
As with benefits, there are two ways to calculate employment outcomes. The first is to consider the 
percentage of people who are in employment at given durations after starting the programme. The 
second is to consider the average percentage of time starts are observed to spend in employment 
over a given duration window beginning upon programme start date. 
Note: Participants who started on the various New Deals in the nancial year 2005-06. ‘hard 
skills option’=higher/occupational skills training, dened in Section 5.6.1.
Using administrative data to inform CBF for duration of benefits and employment, 
and wages
58
For these estimates, we make the assumption that those individuals without employment records 
were not employed44. We also make assumptions relating to the most appropriate start date to 
specify for a programme (see Section 5.5). We calculated the cross-tabulations using all three start 
dates, but here we only report our ‘preferred’ programme start date. For most programmes, with  
the exception of NDDP, using a different start date did not significantly alter the results. 
Figure 5.9, illustrates the per cent of programme participants in employment for a given number of 
months after their programme start date. For the ND25+ programme, participants have an initial 
jump in employment followed by a slow steady increase in employment. Those in basic skills training 
have the worst employment outcomes. This could be (partially at least) due to selection effects, 
where the least skilled are selected into this option. 
The relationship between per cent employed and time since programme start is similar for the 
NDLP. However, overall employment rates are higher. It is also noticeable that among lone parents 
those going through ‘Higher/Occupational skills training’ (labelled ‘hard skills’) eventually reach 
employment levels of 40 per cent, which is only slightly surpassed by the ‘Subsidised/volunteer 
employment option’. 
Interestingly, NDDP shows the highest employment levels. ND50+ is not illustrated in Figure 5.9. 
However, the relationship between employment rates and months since programme start looks 
similar for this programme, with 25 per cent of claimants working three months after the start of 
the programme and about 30 per cent working two years after the start (Table A.8). The NDP is not 
presented because the employment results are linked using an ID for the participant’s partner (i.e. 
the main claimant) though these main claimants increase employment from about 36 to 42 per 
cent employment over the same period (Table A.23).
44 It is worth noting that for a small number of cases (see Section 5.4) employment data are 
missing but wage data exist, indicating that this is sometimes a false assumption. However, 
since employment calculations are made for specific time periods within the year and the 
wage data only exists for the total year, one is unable to determine whether the individuals 
with wage data but no employment data were employed in the specific period of interest. 
Given the indeterminacy of the dates as well as how infrequently an individual has wage but 
not employment information, these individuals are assumed to be not employed.
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Figure 5.9 The per cent of clients employed up to 24 months following  
 programme start
 
We reach similar conclusions looking at the average per cent of time that individuals are employed. 
Looking at Figure 5.10, we see that the same patterns found in snapshots hold true for the window-
based measurement. Most notably, those in subsidised employment or volunteering options 
are more likely to be employed and participants in the NDDP people have relatively better gross 
employment outcomes. 
Note: HMRC employment data January 2004 –June 2009 (spells can start before 2004). 
Post-programme employment spells. Participants who started on the various New Deals in 
the financial year 2005-06; ‘hard skills option’=higher/occupational skills training, defined 
in Section 5.6.1. 
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Figure 5.10 Average per cent of possible time employed that programme  




5.9.4 Gross nominal earnings
It is important to note, when looking at earnings, that we selected individuals based on their 
programme participation in 2005-06. This means that by definition the earnings for these individuals 
would have been lowest in 2005-06 (they were claiming benefits), or else they would not have 
qualified for the programme. This can be seen in Figure 5.11, where the shaded area is the 2005-06 
programme	participation	period,	and	which	for	all	indicates	2006	is	the	lowest	point;	however,	note	
that the lowest point is not zero.
Earnings data are then reported for programme participants who entered in the 2005-06 tax year. 
The estimates are for the subset of individuals who were observed with earnings data. Non-taxable 
earnings (i.e. very low earners) are not observed in the earnings data. Each programme participant 
45 All cases includes those going through options as well as those not going through options.
Note: HMRC employment data January 2004 –June 2009 (spells can start before 2004). 
Post-programme employment spells. Participants who started on the various New Deals in 
the financial year 2005-06; ‘hard skills option’=higher/occupational skills training, defined in 
Section 5.6.1.
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record from 2005-06 had one variable for taxable income for each fiscal tax year (2005-2009, 
April-March), for example total taxable earnings recorded for the tax year 2005-06. (This is the total 
earnings of participants who are observed at some point in 2005-06 with earnings data, of those 
with earnings data, so there is no one with zero for earnings data in the estimate.)
Looking at mean earnings across all programmes in Figure 5.11, we see that participant earnings 
declined between 2004 (when they were not on the programme) and 2005 (where they entered 
the programme) and stayed low through 2006 (when they were likely to still be in the programme). 
While participants’ earnings did recover they never seem to recover to their pre-programme levels. 
Tables A.5, A.10, A.15, A.20, A.25, A.30 show the estimates underlying Figure 5.11.
Note that these are all nominal earnings and would need to be adjusted for the effects of inflation 
and also wage growth over time (with an appropriate measure) to reflect the current earnings level 
at a later date. Earnings can be adjusted for growth over time using the Office for National Statistics 
annual median earnings measure46.
Regardless of this, the results seem plausible in interpretation. ND50+ participants are often workers 
who lose their jobs and then find it difficult to re-enter the workplace given their age. As such, it 
might be expected that the ND50+ group overall will not recoup their earnings. Similarly, those 
entering the NDDP programme were not necessarily disabled before entering the programme, but 
became ill/disabled in 2005-06. Hence they may earn relatively lower earnings upon their return to 
the workforce. In contrast, because participants who enter NDYP are at the beginning of their careers 
they recoup their pre-benefit earnings levels upon their return to work. NDLP participants almost 
entirely recoup their prior earnings levels. The participants of ND25+ never appear to recover to their 
pre-programme earnings in the follow-up period, as for ND50+. 
46 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=13101 The Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) provides information about the levels, distribution and make-
up of earnings and hours paid for employees within industries, occupations and regions. In 
particular, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/article.asp?ID=2370 the Holdsworth series would 
be useful for overall medians, make-up and distribution of earnings of the 2009 ASHE. The 
analysis compares the 2009 results with the results from 1997. ASHE focuses on estimates 
of the median rather than the mean. The median is the value below which 50 per cent of 
employees fall. The median is preferred to the mean for earnings as it is less affected by 
extreme values and the skewed distribution of earnings data. However, estimates of the mean 
are still available in the annually published results.
Using administrative data to inform CBF for duration of benefits and employment, 
and wages
62
Figure 5.11 Mean nominal gross earnings for those working with earnings records 
 across programmes47, for tax years 2004-09, for programme 
 participation defined in 2005-06 tax year
 
 
Looking at results by option in Figure 5.12, we can see that those workers with very high pre-
programme earnings seem to start the self employment option. However, particularly for the 
ND25+ participants, individuals going through the self employment option have a permanent post-
programme reduction in earnings. This, however, may reflect the fact that HMRC data does not 
include self-employment income. Those going through ‘hard skills’ training have a temporary dip 
in earnings below their basic skills counterparts (who are presumably less well educated), but later 
catch up. For NDLP, ‘job readiness’ options seem to yield weak results. For NDDP and NDYP, there is 
little variation in earnings by option. 
47 Tables A.5 (ND25+), A.10 (ND50+), A.15 (NDLP), A.20 (NDDP), A.25 (NDP) and A.30 (NDYP) show 
the estimates underlying Figure 5.11.
Note: HMRC data January 2004 – June 2009. Participants who started on the various New 
Deals in the financial tax year 2005-06.
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Figure 5.12 Mean earnings for those working, for each programme by option, for  




We also examined earnings for some subgroups in each programme, where data was available. 
Figure 5.13 shows NDYP and NDLP gross earnings by ethnicity. The caution set out in Chapter 3 
on subgroup impacts should be applied to interpretation of these results. In addition, these are 
gross nominal earnings analyses, not net earnings impact analyses and do not represent the 
programme impact. 
Note: HMRC data January 2004 –June 2009. Participants who started on the various New Deals in 
the nancial year 2005-06; ‘hard skills option’=higher/occupational skills training, dened in 
Section 5.6.1.
Using administrative data to inform CBF for duration of benefits and employment, 
and wages
64
Figure 5.13 Mean earnings for those working, for each programme by ethnicity:  
 for tax years 2004-09, for programme participation defined in  
 2005-06 tax year
 
 
Results are available by marital status for the ND25+ and NDYP programmes. (There are not enough 
divorced NDYP participants to include a trend line in the graphic.) Results show that those who are 
married have higher earnings. Note for some, such as the widowed, the trend is unstable due to a 
low number of observations. 
Figure 5.14 Mean nominal gross earnings for those working, for each programme  
 by marital status: for tax years 2004-09, for programme  
 participation defined in 2005-06 tax year
 
 
Note: HMRC data January 2004 –June 2009. Participants who started on the various New Deals 
in the financial year 2005-06.
Note: HMRC data January 2004 –June 2009. Participants who started on the various New Deals 
in the financial year 2005-06.
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6 Multiple programme 
 participation
Greenberg and Knight (2007) indicate that the minimum that should be done in a cost benefit 
analysis (CBA) to examine multiple programme participation is an assessment of how many 
participants are on multiple programmes or repeatedly participate in a programme. 







dynamics – when people participate and programme combinations).
It is recommended that the best way to reflect multiple participation is through discussion and 
estimation of the scale of multiple participation observed and exploring the importance of the 
timing of the gaps between participation. An assessment is also made of what data is available for 
this and how it can be obtained. This chapter also investigates whether there is a way to measure, 
for a specific programme, the extent to which the outcomes achieved by the programme are partly 
due to the intervention regimes that preceded it (repetition).
6.1 Multiple participation in existing cost benefit analysis
The current evaluation evidence on most effects of mandatory and voluntary programmes is based 
on impact assessments examining the effects of particular cohorts starting a programme. 
In CBAs for most programmes, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) relies on impact 
assessments from studies on the effectiveness of programmes. Most of these studies focus on a 
particular entry cohort into a programme. However, mandatory programmes, in particular, may 
result in cohorts repeatedly beginning a programme. This means that some participants of the 
cohort under consideration may be participating a second or third time. The programme effects on 
these repeated spells might be quite different than the effects on first-time participants. Thus, an 
estimated employment outcome for a particular cohort entering a programme potentially covers 
differential effects for a diversity of participants starting the programme either a first or a repeated 
time. This may not be entirely informative for CBA in the context of mandatory programmes 
enforcing repeated participation. As a consequence, it is important to outline the programme design 
for participation and the complexity of the resulting programme combinations over time as the 
impacts can differ by participation type. 
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6.2 Identifying the complexity of programme participation
Using Master Index (MI) data48 allows us to get a clear picture of individual programme participation. 
As in the secondary evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) (Knight et al., 2006), 
exploiting all longitudinal information offered by these data provides a thorough understanding of 
the combinations of services delivered to the main target groups, e.g. lone parents or disabled job 
seekers. MI data can show the full extent of multiple and repeated participation that job seekers 
experience, reflecting many issues currently neglected in evaluation studies, in particular:
•	 Multiple programmes: There are usually different options for eligible benefit claimants, e.g. the 
participants on the various New Deals, who can begin training programmes like Basic Skills or 
programmes allowing them to gain work experience (e.g. an employment option on the ‘option 
stage’ of the New Deals). 
•	 Repeated participation: Many programmes are mandatory, like the New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP), and as for now, empirical evidence does not account for the effects of the first (or an 
initial) programme participation as compared to a later participation. However, the effects 
of a second participation may be different, and averaging the outcomes of first and second 
participation may not be the most informative for some types of cost/benefit appraisal questions. 
•	 Participation dynamics: Currently, most studies do not account for potential selection problems 
based on unobservable characteristics or a potential future participation in programmes. However, 
there are important reasons why evaluation evidence may be biased if such problems are ignored. 
6.3 Multiple programmes: programme effects relative to  
 other alternatives
This section explores the multiple programmes available to a particular eligible group. This mostly 
includes the designed multiplicity of programmes such as NDYP Options – in this case, usually one 
can only participate in any one Option at a single point in time (multiple instances over time then 
are covered in the next section). Such multiplicity of programmes for a particular eligible group can 
arise without design, but is usually a less common case. 
As different options exist for a single target group, it is often very important to understand which of 
the available programmes are most suitable. Even within a particular programme (like Work-Based 
Learning for Adults (WBLA)), different sub-programmes exist (like Short job-focused training or Basic 
Employability Training).
Lechner (2001) has pioneered approaches to evaluating multiple programme options. Essentially, 
an evaluation of relative outcome effects of different programmes can be achieved by comparisons 
of matched individuals receiving different programme alternatives (and also compared to no 
participation at all, showing the effect of the programme relative to no participation at all). 
Formally, the estimation of relative programme effects in Lechner (2001) identifies effects as the 
difference in expected values between a particular outcome for a particular treatment compared 
to the outcome for alternative states. This framework can be generalised for a number of different 
programme alternatives out of a choice set. As with all non-experimental evaluation studies, the 
natural measure of comparison (‘counterfactual’ outcome) of a participant in a programme cannot 
be observed and the causal effect can only be identified by imposing additional assumptions. 
48  See Appendix D for a description.
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The identification of alternative non-treatment outcomes relies on a Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA): conditional on descriptive characteristics variables, the actual observed outcome 
is independent of the actual participation in either one of the different programmes as long as there 
are comparable participants in the other options (or non-participants) with similar characteristics. 
In practical terms, it is sufficient to compare participants in one particular programme with 
participants in a particular other alternative as long as both groups show similar characteristics. 
By means of such comparisons, one can show the relative gain of participating in long-term 
occupational training as compared to short-term job-focused training. Comparing the effects found 
for one programme relative to another is informative as the net gain of one programme relative to 
another can be contrasted to the relative cost differences. 
Lechner (2001) also shows that his framework for estimating such relative programme effects 
can be combined with propensity score matching, which greatly simplifies the practical work of 
estimating the relative programme effects. The propensity score as a function of the covariates as 
opposed to a direct match on a large number of different characteristics does not result in a lack 
of similar comparisons, and yet, characteristics would be similar for participants in the different 
programme alternatives. 
Although the econometric methods of estimating such relative programme effects was established 
some time ago, very few evaluation studies have been published comparing the effects of one 
programme to another. The reason for the lack of such evidence is primarily a matter of insufficient 
information	available;	participants’	surveys	and	administrative	data	usually	do	not	allow	an	
understanding of why individuals were assigned to one particular programme and not to another. 
Only if such information is known to the researcher (and the CIA is then credible), can one validly 
compare participants in one programme with participants in another. Therefore, in order to estimate 
the relative programme effects, one would need to include a number of important implementation 
variables. Once such information is available, one can estimate the net gain of participating in one 
programme as relative to the participation in another programme.
Applying the Lechner (2001) framework, one can estimate the effect of one option as compared to 
other options. There are two informative estimates which can be achieved:
•	 an	estimate	of	the	average	programme	effect	in	one	particular	option	compared	to	non-
participation in any of the programmes (which was used for estimating the effects of WBLA (see 
Speckesser	and	Bewley	(2006));	or
•	 the	comparison	of	participating	in	one	particular	option	as	compared	to	another	option,	‘Pairwise	
comparison’ (which was the design applied in Biewen et al. (2008)). 
6.4 Repetition, participation dynamics and the effects of  
 programme combinations
If participation in one particular programme is followed by another programme, it may be 
appropriate to combine first and second treatments and think of it as a combined intervention. One 
would then estimate the effects of the combination of the two programmes, i.e. the effect of the 
entire sequence. 
An estimation of the combined effect of first and further treatments may be justified if the initial 
selection into such combinations of treatments, i.e. prior to the beginning of the first elements of the 
treatment combination, can be modelled correctly. This implies that the researchers have a good 
understanding of the implementation of programmes and know how participants are assigned into 
particular suites of different programmes. 
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If, however, the participation in a subsequent element of observed treatment combination depends 
on the outcome of the first treatment, it may be questionable to evaluate combinations of first and 
second treatments as the real participation process may not justify such an aggregation.
It has been shown in earlier analysis of the combined effect of Lone Parent Work-Focused Interviews 
(LPWFI) and the NDLP (Knight et al., 2006) that an evaluation of bundles or combinations of 
programmes may be reasonable for treatments occurring at the same time or not requiring explicit 
outcomes of a first/initial treatment. 
The current method of estimating the relative costs and benefits of employment programmes 
is structured along the lines of individual programmes rather than particular combinations, like 
the combination of participation on a specific New Deal programme with some particular option 
elements like Basic Skills. However, an evaluation of sequences could be informative to find the 
option bundle for particular target groups in terms of labour market impact and cost effectiveness. 
This would however require knowledge of the particular assignment mechanism into a suite of 
programmes, which would only be possible if reasonably high quality data on the process existed. 
For better assessment of programme participation, we recommend that more quantitative 
management information on (caseworker) selection for services is recorded into the Labour Market 
System (LMS)49, that the quality of recording is better maintained and checked, and that it is used for 
evaluation purposes. 
6.5 Effects of programme repetition
In the context of some mandatory programmes, some participants may participate in the same 
programmes more than once. A prominent UK example for repeated participation is the LPWFI and 
NDLP combinations (see Knight et al.,	2006;	Dolton	et al., 2004). 
It is very unlikely that a second participation in the same programme yields the same returns for 
participating individuals as the first participation. Only a very few evaluation studies have ever 
considered the issue that the returns of programme participation may differ for a second participation 
in the same programme. Instead, in most studies, there is a focus on ‘programme participation’, 
irrespective of whether individuals have previously participated in the programme (history). This results 
in an estimate which implicitly averages the programme effects of first and further participations. 
In practical research, there can be great difficulties with regard to understanding the allocation of 
participants to a second or further reiteration of the same programme. This is important to explore 





of participation over time (i.e. can we assume independence of the participation spells)?
The recent literature in the context of repeated treatments suggests that different options exist 
for the evaluation of the effects of a first treatment and of additional incremental effects of later 
treatments (e.g. Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005). 
49 LMS is used for the Jobcentre Plus services supplier. For private sector supplied services, it will 
be important that sufficient management information data is collected in a similar format, 
because if the same level of management information from external providers is not available 
there is a further constraint in the analysis that can be done – for example, it might not be 
possible to compare impacts or value for money of services from the different supplier(s).
Multiple programme participation
69
In the theoretical literature, the evaluation of repeated treatments from observational data 
distinguishes the initial effects of a first participation from incremental effects of a second 
participation (see Lechner and Miquel, 2002). Such a framework requires separate econometric 
modelling of the decision to participate at different points in time while a benefit spell is ongoing,  
i.e. it requires a dynamic framework.
In empirical work (Bergmann et al., 2004), combined effects of a first and second programme 
participation have been estimated as well as the incremental effect of a second programme 
participation. This however assumes that selection into a particular combination can be adequately 
controlled for before the beginning of the first treatment, neglecting a possible sequential 
assignment into programmes. 
A plausible approach for evaluation of the incremental effects of repeated participation has been 
discussed theoretically by Lechner and Miquel (2002) modelling the decision to participate in 
the second iteration separately from the decision to participate a first time. The corresponding 
evaluation framework mirrors such a stepwise decision for participation in a two-stage procedure 
of the established multiple treatment approach taking into account that participation in the second 
treatment depends on the outcome of a first treatment. Lechner and Wieler (2007) demonstrate 
with an application to Austrian data. 
A practical example is as follows: if employment depends on the skills an individual offers, then a 
single participation in a programme like WBLA surely affects this variable. The evaluation therefore 
has to take account of the outcome of the first WBLA participation as an important variable for a 
potential second participation. Since the outcome of the first participation may lead to successful 
labour market integration for some participants and may lead into a second participation for others, 
the comparison group used for the evaluation of the first participation is no longer informative 
in order to estimate the outcome of non-participation in the first reiteration. A new comparison 
group needs to be found for the group participating another time – potentially consisting of 
the participants in the first programme. Out of the group of programme participants, the group 
showing a second participation should then ideally be compared with individuals participating in 
the programme only once who show on average similar characteristics. As long as the observed 
characteristics are similar between both groups, then CIA is again assumed to hold, i.e. that the 
comparison group represents the outcome that would have materialised if there had been no 
second participation. Note that historically many United Kingdom programmes are targeted at 
specific groups, for example a lone parent claiming Income Support can go on NDLP) but is unlikely 
to go on NDDP (New Deal for Disabled People) (available to IB claimants), due to the eligibility 
requirements. These methods are only relevant where similar participants might participate in 
different programmes.
The implication is that we need to understand the process leading to a second participation in order 
to validate the treatment estimation. A repeated participation could be because of the mandatory 
nature of the programme (like the New Deals) or because of individuals opting in to participate in 
some activity twice. As with the evaluation of multiple programme alternatives, a research design 
for the evaluation of incremental programme effects exist (see Lechner and Miquel, 2002), but has 
rarely been applied to programme evaluations. 
The outcome of a first participation can be very important for modelling the selection into the 
second participation, but only if the outcome of the first programme is considered to be exogenous 
from the participation in the second programme (Lechner and Miquel, 2002: 13). An example 
for such an outcome could be an insufficient result, e.g. a failed certificate of achievement for 
some particular training, which could then be obtained in a repetition. However, this may not be a 
credible assumption on how programmes can influence adult learning. If the outcome of the first 
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participation in a programme changes because of the second participation and the success of the 
first programme participation only materialises during the second participation, then those who 
participate only once will not be a realistic comparison group. Such a possibility is very likely if the 
programme content differs, e.g. for training programmes. The learning on a second programme 
may then actually help achieving the outcome of the first programme. Under such circumstances, 
it is no longer clear whether we can attribute the impact of a programme to a first or a second 
participation of the programme. If we attributed everything to the second participation, we would 
incorrectly overstate the impact. If we attributed everything to the first participation, we would 
understate it. Either way, the group of participants who did the programme but who did not retake 
it does no longer allow the estimation of the non-participation in the second round: this group has 
had the programme impact of the first programme and – with no second programme participation 
– an effect of the first programme induced by the participation in the second programme will not 
materialise. 
The evidence of employment outcomes in the context of multiple treatments is weak due to the 
statistical difficulties of modelling a second or further participation. Hence, evaluation should be 
constrained to be for the first treatment. In the case of the UK programmes, there has been no 
exploration of how we can evaluate first and further increments of particular programmes. However, 
the descriptive evidence (Knight et al., 2006) shows how important this potentially is (in particular, in 
the context of mandatory programmes) – see Section 6.7.
 
Programme repetition needs to be measured – what share of participants have one, two, three 
or more participations? 
In the event of substantive second or further participation, compare the characteristics of 
those with ‘two participations’ against those with ‘one participation’, if statistically similar 
(t tests should be used to determine whether they differ) then the comparison group for 
one participation can be the same as that for two participations, i.e. the overall impact of all 
treatments is reasonable but may contain some bias. Reporting should clearly indicate that  
the impact could represent an average impact of different participations and there may be 
some bias.
The process of participation needs to be explored in the reporting, in the context of whether it 
might be reasonable to consider the second participation to be unaffected (exogenous) by the 
outcome of the initial participation. 
Where there is substantial second or further treatment, and the characteristics of the groups 
statistically differ, we recommend that valid impact analysis should restrict the treatment to 
the first participation in a programme. This means for the cost-benefit that the total additional 
time is only for the members of a cohort who are on their first participation. The reporting 
should clearly state this restriction. 
There can be important information for programme design purposes in estimating the 
incremental effects of second and further participations, and then conducting the cost-benefit 
by these subgroups. This does have information requirements by subgroup, such as costs by 
subgroup. For example, the incremental impact of a second treatment may be very small 
relative to the costs and it can inform that restricting to one participation is cost-effective. 
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6.6 Differences in effects due to different durations of benefit  
 before participation
The duration of unemployment or benefit receipt before participation in any of the programmes is an 
important explanation for the assignment to treatment. Indeed, for some programmes, individuals 
are mandated to join after given lengths of time spent on benefits. However, in most evaluation 
studies, the time spent on job search before participation in a programme is widely ignored. 
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) show that ignoring the participation dynamics of when 
people participate (or decide not to) may result in biased estimates of the employment effect. 
First, individuals who are not treated up to the end of the time period might be participants in 
a programme after this time. Bearing this in mind, a comparison group partially includes later 
participants and may therefore have less favourable employment prospects than true non-
participants. If this is taken into account, the comparison group may not be an appropriate estimate 
of the non-treatment outcomes, even when conditioning on observable characteristics, and would 
result in biased estimates. Second, evaluation studies usually consider participation in a particular 
time period, e.g. the first six months of unemployment or so. However, the comparison group may 
not represent an unbiased estimate for the treatment group as some of the non-participants may 
have actively refused programme participation because of an anticipated job entry. Thus, even 
when conditioning on observable characteristics, the comparison group would indeed have more 
favourable employment prospects and the treatment effects would be biased. 
One can never rule out that individuals who do not receive treatment today may not be participants 
in the future. This could lead to bias in estimates of employment effects. To avoid this, it could be 
assumed that the timing of treatment matters. For example, if treatment in one year differs from 
the treatment in the next year, then a comparison group whose members do not start treatment in 
the specific period could provide a valid non-treatment outcome. 
Hazard model approaches are another important method of evaluating programme effectiveness in 
the presence of dynamic selection issues as they allow a simultaneous modelling of the transition 
into programmes and outcomes. 
These approaches are increasingly important because they allow dynamic selection issues to 
depend on unobserved heterogeneity50 in both participation and outcomes (Abbring and Heckman, 
2007). Abbring and van den Berg (2003) explain how, under particular assumptions, a non-
parametric model of both transition to programme participation and outcomes can be used to 
identify the causal effect of the treatment in non-experimental data conditional on observed 
covariates, general dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. 
As far as we know, there are no studies for the UK considering the dynamics of the comparison group. 
6.7 Empirical evidence
A number of studies have published a comprehensive evaluation of multiple and mutually exclusive 
treatments. These include Biewen et al. (2008), Fitzenberger et al. (2009), Lechner et al. (2005), Hotz 
et al. (2006) and Knight et al. (2006). 
50 Both true state dependence in outcome variables (e.g. employment outcomes for individuals 
are conditional on previous employment outcomes) or unobserved heterogeneity can explain 




Some of these recent studies also consider the selection into programmes as a dynamic problem. 
They compare the participation with non-participation or later participation based on Sianesi’s 
(2004) paper outlining participation dynamics as an important concept. In the following, we review 
some of the most important findings of these studies and discuss the applicability of the approach in 
the context of the UK. 
Biewen et al. (2008), Fitzenberger et al. (2009) and Lechner et al. (2005) use similar data from 
the German Social Insurance Records and compare the relative effectiveness of different training 
programmes available for particular target groups among the unemployed. The design of these 
evaluation studies always focuses on particular entry cohorts into unemployment and the 
participation in a particular programme alternative after some elapsed duration of unemployment. 
These studies find, in most cases, positive effects of the different alternatives compared to non-
participation, but also considerable differences in the programme effectiveness when comparing 
two alternatives with each other. In addition, the programme effectiveness seems to be higher for 
job seekers having been unemployed six months or more before the beginning of the programme. 
Hotz et al. (2006) evaluate the differential effects of labour force attachment (LFA) versus human 
capital development (HCD) training components from California’s Greater Avenues to Independence 
(GAIN) programme. They find stronger positive effects of LFA in the short term and stronger positive 
effects of HCD in the long term.
Knight et al. (2006) evaluate the impact of different combinations of LPWFIs and NDLP on the 
movements off benefit by eligible lone parents, with NDLP, LPWFI, or the combination of both, 
as particular ‘routes’ through the benefit system. The paper focuses on the differential effects, 
applying a static multiple treatment framework for the first programme participation of the eligible 
population in the light of very substantial repeated participation. The main findings support a strong 
positive effect of NDLP, but do not clearly show additional benefits of LPWFI. 
While all these studies applied a framework evaluating mutually exclusive alternative treatments 
for particular entry cohorts, there are few papers using Lechner and Miquel’s (2002) identification 
strategy of effects of reiterated treatments. While there was strong evidence for repeated 
participation in the secondary evaluation of the NDLP (Knight et al., 2006), so far there has not been 
a consistent evaluation of a second or further participation in the same programme except for 
the Austrian analysis by Lechner and Wieler (2007) and Bergeman et al. (2000). If the full variety 
of services available for a particular eligible group was considered, we would possibly see many 
more persons participating in particular elements of welfare-to-work programmes more than 
once. However, there has not been a consistent evaluation of repeated participation for the UK 
programmes.
Generally, the methodology for the evaluation of sequential treatments is established. However, it is 
uncertain as to whether data are sufficiently informative to apply these methods. 
 
Improved recording quality of LMS management information would likely allow one to estimate 




6.8 Exploring the magnitude and impact of multiple participation 
 in the UK
The estimates of employment effects used in cost benefit analysis (CBA) in DWP are usually based 
on the results of particular evaluation studies. These estimates are based on specific entry cohorts. 
 
We recommend re-analysing the employment effect of the cohorts currently underlying 
the employment effects included in DWP’s CBA, exploring participation repetition and 
characteristics and identifying the extent of multiple reiterated treatments, focusing on the 
most important programmes (e.g. the programmes for job seekers, like the New deals).




programme and what the participants did between these iterations? This should give some 
indication about the mutual dependency of both treatments, and whether we can assume some 
weak independence between a first and a second participation or not. 
•	 What	are	the	employment	outcomes	for	participants	who	only	participated	once,	e.g.	on	the	
average employment in a particular period following participation? In the light of multiple 
repeated treatments, what is the initial effect of a first participation – what is the incremental 
effect of a second participation separately? This should give some indication on how the average 
effect currently used for DWP internal CBA compares to an effect which explicitly considers the 
multiplicity of the programme participation.
The available data from administrative records can be used for an empirical exploration of the 
magnitude of multiple programme participation and the estimation of employment and benefit 
effects of first and later participations. WPLS data have a comprehensive history of all benefit and 











In principle, the extent of multiple participation can be shown for all programmes implemented by 
the DWP in recent years as data can usually be linked by the encrypted National Insurance numbers. 
Consequently, many more programme combinations and repetition issues could be explored (for 
programmes such as Action Teams Adult Learning Option Pilot, Workstep, Progress2Work, Minority 
Ethnic Outreach, IB Reforms, Access to Work, Referrals). For larger programmes, like the New Deals 





We recommend estimating the effect of a first participation, and then, when relevant, also 
estimating the effect of a second participation in the largest recent mandatory programmes 
(e.g. the New Deals). First, the extent of initial and later programme participation should be 
identified. Based on available data (WPLS/MI) employment and benefit outcomes of first and 
later participation in these programmes should be estimated separately. 
Estimates of programme effects which have disregarded the particular number of repetitions of 
the programme should be replaced by estimated effects which reflect the true characteristics 
of the participants under consideration, i.e. whether this is a first or a later participation. 
With better impact estimation of multiple participation impacts, it might be necessary to have 
more detailed cost information as costs may differ across participations. With such further 




Appendix A  
Benefit duration, employment 
duration and wages results by 
programme
Results begin with the New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus (ND25+) programme, for which all 
subgroups were available. For some programmes, rows are missing when there is no data available. 
For example, the New Deal for individuals aged 50 plus (ND50+) programme does not have 
programme options. Options can start at a date after the programme entry. 




NDLP VS, and NDLP VS Familiarisation. 
•	 New	Deal	for	Disabled	People	(NDDP):	payptjb,	payptse,	payftjb,	payftse,	payptft,	pyptftse,	pyptsus,	





Basic skills training includes: 
•	 ND25+:	BET/BS	option.	
•	 NDLP:	basic	skills,	other	training,	WBLA,	NDLP	B-Skills,	NDLP	IAP	Education	and	Training,	LSC	BS	
Training, and LSC ESOL Start. 
•	 For	the	NDDP,	NDP,	and	NDYP:	no	variables	indicated	a	basic	skills	option.	
Higher/occupational skills training (labelled hard skills option in figures) includes: 
•	 ND25+:	FTE,	WBLA,	ETO,	and	Training	for	Work.	
•	 NDLP:	Other	Education/Training,	SJFT,	AM	Demand	Led	Training,	European	Social	Fund	(ESF)	
Provision, ESF ILM, Nat/Prog Dev Fund, FTE, FTE training familiarisation, Careers, LSC Occ Training, 





Music NDLP MOLP. 
•	 NDP	and	NDYP:	no	self	employment	option	was	coded.	





seminar, job fairs, progress to work, Environmental Task Force (ETF) (familiarisation), job search 
and advice (J&A), Gateway (GW) training (KS, IT, Motivation, or Voc), and Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC) Information Advice and Guidance (IAG). 
•	 NDP:	first	start/receiving	advice	and	guidance.
•	 NDYP:	no	job	readiness	option.	
ND50+: There was no available information on options for those in ND50+.
ND25+ 
Table A.1 New Deal 25+ benefit receipt rates for selected start dates of 
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation
Percentage share on benefit (at selected points in time following start)
Months since programme start





All participants 63% 44% 51% 49% 43%
With basic skills 48% 26% 62% 63% 57%
With higher skills 73% 45% 66% 64% 58%
With job readiness 69% 34% 58% 58% 51%
With subsidised employment 71% 39% 60% 59% 54%




All participants 59% 43% 51% 48% 42%
With basic skills 41% 25% 63% 63% 56%
With higher skills 68% 45% 66% 64% 57%
With job readiness 66% 33% 57% 57% 52%
With subsidised employment 65% 39% 61% 59% 53%





All participants 59% 43% 51% 48% 42%
With basic skills 41% 25% 63% 63% 56%
With higher skills 68% 45% 66% 64% 57%
With job readiness 66% 33% 57% 57% 52%
With subsidised employment 65% 39% 61% 59% 53%
With self employment 47% 18% 25% 29% 27%
Note: For example, row 1, cdpstart: of all individuals starting ND25+, 63 per cent are observed on benefit three 
months after the programme start (defined by Cdpstart), 44 per cent at six months, etc. 
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Table A.2 New Deal 25+ average per cent of time on benefit for selected start  
 dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months  
 after participation
Percentage of time spent on benefit in periods following participation
Months since programme start





All participants 77% 65% 57% 54% 52%
With basic skills 71% 53% 49% 54% 55%
With higher skills 85% 71% 65% 65% 64%
With job readiness 80% 65% 57% 57% 57%
With subsidised employment 82% 68% 60% 60% 59%




All participants 73% 61% 55% 53% 51%
With basic skills 64% 48% 48% 53% 55%
With higher skills 82% 67% 63% 64% 63%
With job readiness 77% 61% 56% 57% 56%
With subsidised employment 79% 63% 59% 59% 59%





All participants 73% 61% 55% 53% 51%
With basic skills 64% 48% 48% 53% 55%
With higher skills 82% 67% 63% 64% 63%
With job readiness 77% 61% 56% 57% 56%
With subsidised employment 79% 63% 59% 59% 59%
With self employment 69% 49% 35% 33% 31%
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Table A.3 New Deal 25+ per cent employed for selected start dates of 
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation 
Start 
variable
Months since programme start








All cases 21% 23% 25% 25% 26%
With basic skills 14% 16% 18% 18% 19%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%
With job readiness 16% 19% 23% 24% 26%
With subsidised employment 19% 23% 27% 27% 28%







All cases 21% 23% 25% 26% 26%
With basic skills 14% 16% 18% 18% 19%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%
With job readiness 16% 20% 23% 25% 26%
With subsidised employment 20% 23% 27% 28% 28%








All cases 21% 23% 25% 26% 26%
With basic skills 14% 16% 18% 18% 19%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%
With job readiness 16% 20% 23% 25% 26%
With subsidised employment 20% 23% 27% 28% 28%
With self employment 16% 16% 19% 21% 23%
Note: For example, row 1, cdpstart: of all individuals starting ND25+, 21 per cent are observed in HMRC 
employment three months after the programme start, 23 per cent at six months, etc.
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Table A.4 New Deal 25+ average per cent of time employed for selected  




Months since programme start








All cases 19% 21% 23% 24% 24%
With basic skills 13% 14% 16% 17% 17%
With hard skills 15% 16% 19% 20% 21%
With job readiness 15% 17% 19% 21% 22%
With subsidised employment 19% 20% 23% 24% 25%







All cases 20% 21% 23% 24% 25%
With basic skills 13% 14% 16% 17% 18%
With hard skills 15% 17% 19% 20% 21%
With job readiness 15% 17% 20% 21% 23%
With subsidised employment 19% 20% 23% 25% 26%








All cases 20% 21% 23% 24% 25%
With basic skills 13% 14% 16% 17% 18%
With hard skills 15% 17% 19% 20% 21%
With job readiness 16% 17% 20% 21% 23%
With subsidised employment 19% 20% 23% 25% 26%
With self employment 15% 16% 17% 18% 19%
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Table A.5 New Deal 25+ mean annual nominal taxable wages observed for  
 employed (£)
Year





All cases 14,864 6,495 6,190 8,720 10,158 10,475
With basic skills 11,433 4,650 4,822 6,404 7,820 7,901
With hard skills 11,874 4,452 4,217 6,495 8,619 8,981
With job readiness 11,974 5,225 5,413 7,609 9,490 10,276
With subsidised 
employment
12,941 5,429 5,479 8,073 9,894 10,378







Missing 15,055 6,742 6,615 9,247 10,811 11,035
White 15,138 6,675 6,233 8,693 10,135 10,403
Black 12,991 5,361 6,115 9,084 10,337 11,017
Asian 13,587 4,906 4,986 8,104 9,313 10,273









Unknown 17,907 9,619 6,292 8,626 10,610 9,688
Single 12,556 5,486 5,830 8,457 9,902 10,203
Married 22,317 9,621 7,561 10,143 11,414 11,859
Widowed 15,926 51,131 4,532 7,133 7,530 12,642
Divorced 14,900 6,260 5,708 8,070 9,191 9,358
Separated 14,275 6,126 5,715 8,337 9,886 10,153
Cohabiting 16,420 7,388 7,180 8,925 11,102 11,216
Note: 2004 is pre-programme, 2005 is programme entry year. 
ND50+ 
Table A.6 New Deal 50+ benefit receipt rates for selected start dates of 
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
cdpstart 61% 53% 43% 35% 28%
casestart 61% 53% 43% 35% 28%
initint 63% 55% 45% 37% 30%
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Table A.7 New Deal 50+ average per cent of time on benefit for selected start  
 dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months  
 after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
cdpstart 70% 63% 55% 50% 45%
casestart 70% 64% 56% 50% 45%
initint 72% 65% 57% 52% 47%
Table A.8 New Deal 50+ per cent employed for selected start dates of  
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation 
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
cdpstart 25% 28% 30% 31% 31%
casestart 19% 20% 22% 23% 23%
initint 21% 23% 24% 25% 26%
Table A.9 New Deal 50+ average per cent of time employed for selected start 
 dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months  
 after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
cdpstart 23% 25% 27% 28% 29%
gwstdt 18% 19% 20% 21% 22%
nd1intdt 19% 21% 22% 23% 24%
Table A.10 New Deal 50+ mean annual taxable wages for employed (£) 
Year







All cases 24,981 12,535 6,798 9,385 10,471 10,174
Missing 23,145 11,076 6,366 8,766 9,200 9,660
White 25,349 12,789 6,911 9,511 10,616 10,289
Black 18,795 9,622 5,663 7,724 9,374 8,464
Asian 23,272 10,721 5,554 8,094 9,687 9,250
Mixed 22,493 10,910 5,820 9,449 10,745 9,667
di
s If disabled 19,041 9,233 5,561 7,568 8,442 8,378
Not disabled 27,568 13,972 7,361 10,192 11,362 10,958
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NDLP
Table A.11 New Deal Lone Parents benefit receipt rates for selected start  
 dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months  
 after participation
Months since programme start





All participants 48% 43% 36% 30% 24%
With basic skills 61% 51% 45% 38% 30%
With higher skills 62% 58% 53% 47% 38%
With job readiness 56% 50% 42% 35% 27%
With subsidised employment 55% 48% 40% 33% 29%





All participants 46% 41% 34% 28% 23%
With basic skills 60% 50% 44% 37% 29%
With higher skills 60% 56% 52% 45% 36%
With job readiness 55% 49% 41% 33% 25%
With subsidised employment 50% 42% 36% 30% 26%





All participants 44% 39% 33% 28% 23%
With basic skills 59% 48% 42% 37% 30%
With higher skills 57% 55% 52% 45% 37%
With job readiness 52% 46% 38% 31% 24%
With subsidised employment 49% 43% 36% 30% 27%
With self employment 51% 39% 32% 25% 19%
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Table A.12 New Deal Lone Parents average per cent of time on benefit for   
 selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
 24 months after participation
Months since programme start





All participants 55% 50% 45% 41% 37%
With basic skills 65% 61% 54% 50% 46%
With higher skills 66% 63% 59% 56% 53%
With job readiness 61% 57% 51% 47% 43%
With subsidised employment 63% 57% 50% 46% 42%





All participants 53% 48% 43% 39% 36%
With basic skills 65% 60% 53% 49% 45%
With higher skills 65% 61% 58% 55% 51%
With job readiness 61% 56% 50% 46% 41%
With subsidised employment 58% 53% 45% 41% 38%





All participants 51% 46% 41% 37% 34%
With basic skills 64% 59% 52% 48% 44%
With higher skills 62% 59% 56% 54% 50%
With job readiness 58% 53% 47% 43% 39%
With subsidised employment 58% 52% 45% 41% 38%
With self employment 56% 50% 44% 38% 34%
Appendices – Benefit duration, employment duration and wages results by programme
84
Table A.13 New Deal Lone Parents per cent employed for selected start dates of  
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation 
 Start 
variable
Months since programme start








All cases 33% 35% 37% 38% 40%
With basic skills 26% 29% 30% 31% 35%
With hard skills 28% 31% 34% 36% 39%
With job readiness 26% 28% 29% 32% 34%
With subsidised employment 36% 37% 40% 41% 41%








All cases 27% 29% 30% 31% 32%
With basic skills 23% 24% 26% 27% 30%
With hard skills 25% 27% 30% 32% 34%
With job readiness 22% 24% 25% 27% 29%
With subsidised employment 32% 34% 35% 36% 36%








All cases 27% 29% 30% 31% 32%
With basic skills 22% 23% 24% 24% 28%
With hard skills 24% 25% 28% 29% 31%
With job readiness 22% 22% 23% 25% 27%
With subsidised employment 32% 32% 34% 35% 35%
With self employment 18% 17% 18% 19% 22%
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Table A.14 New Deal Lone Parents average per cent of time employed for  
 selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
 24 months after participation
Start 
variable
Months since programme start








All cases 31% 32% 34% 35% 36%
With basic skills 24% 26% 27% 29% 30%
With hard skills 37% 28% 31% 32% 34%
With job readiness 25% 26% 27% 28% 29%
With subsidised employment 31% 33% 36% 37% 38%







All cases 25% 27% 28% 29% 30%
With basic skills 21% 22% 24% 25% 26%
With hard skills 23% 25% 27% 28% 29%
With job readiness 21% 22% 23% 24% 25%
With subsidised employment 29% 31% 33% 34% 34%








All cases 25% 26% 28% 28% 29%
With basic skills 20% 21% 23% 24% 24%
With hard skills 22% 23% 25% 26% 27%
With job readiness 20% 21% 22% 23% 23%
With subsidised employment 29% 30% 32% 32% 33%
With self employment 18% 18% 18% 19% 19%
Table A.15 New Deal Lone Parents mean annual taxable wages for employed (£)
Year





All cases 9,238 5,475 4,523 6,659 7,840 8,285
With basic skills 6,938 5,211 4,232 6,840 7,822 8,137
With hard skills 9,729 5,364 4,633 6,505 8,014 8,543
With job readiness 8,102 4,937 3,996 5,345 6,638 7,373
With subsidised 
employment
7,431 4,730 4,069 6,107 7,405 7,525







Missing 10,629 6,526 5,655 7,426 8,637 9,083
White 8,969 5,263 4,332 6,466 7,596 8,052
Black 10,960 6,665 5,464 8,056 9,570 9,953
Asian 9,120 6,048 5,027 7,651 9,199 9,402
Mixed 10,309 5,960 4,986 7,115 8,930 9,487
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NDDP
Table A.16 New Deal Disabled People benefit receipt rates for selected start   




Months since programme start
Type of participation 3 6 12 18 24
ib
st
d All cases 74% 57% 37% 30% 24%





All cases 47% 40% 32% 25% 20%
With subsidised employment 48% 36% 27% 21% 16%
Table A.17 New Deal Disabled People average per cent of time on benefit for  
 selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
 24 months after participation
Start 
variable
Months since programme start
Type of participation 3 6 12 18 24
ib
st
d All cases 79% 72% 59% 50% 44%





All cases 55% 49% 42% 38% 34%
With subsidised employment 61% 51% 41% 35% 31%
Table A.18 New Deal Disabled People per cent employed for selected start  




Months since programme start




dt All cases 42% 41% 39% 37% 36%
With subsidised employment 36% 37% 40% 41% 41%
ib
st
d All cases 27% 27% 28% 29% 30%




rt All cases 36% 38% 40% 41% 42%
With subsidised employment 32% 32% 34% 35% 35%
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Table A.19 New Deal Disabled People average per cent of time employed for  
  selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
  24 months after participation 
Start 
variable
Months since programme start




rt All cases 42% 42% 41% 40% 39%
With subsidised employment 46% 46% 45% 45% 44%
gw
st
dt All cases 27% 27% 27% 28% 28%





All cases 33% 35% 37% 38% 39%
With subsidised employment 44% 49% 52% 54% 55%
Table A.20 New Deal Disabled People mean taxable wages for employed (£)
Year
Subgroup Type of participation 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (May)
All cases 15,884 8,499 6,266 8,458 9,793 9,731






ty Missing 14,256 8,551 6,207 8,732 10,489 10,296
White 15,977 8,530 6,311 8,507 9,820 9,746
Black 16,380 7,755 5,356 7,281 8,726 8,862
Asian 14,154 8,117 5,769 7,747 9,250 9,522
NDP
In the New Deal for Partners programme, the partners are usually included in the main claimant’s 
benefit claim, so the benefit rates initially appear lowith Over time benefit rates increase, as some 
participants initiate independent claims. 
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Table A.21 New Deal Partner benefit receipt rates for selected start dates of 
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
sfrstart 9% 11% 13% 12% 12%
ndpintat NA NA NA NA NA
caselddt 9% 11% 13% 12% 12%
Table A.22 New Deal Partner average per cent of time on benefit for selected  
 start dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months 
 after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
sfrstart 7% 9% 10% 11% 12%
ndpintat NA NA NA NA NA
caselddt 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
Table A.23 New Deal Partner per cent employed for selected start dates of  
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation 
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
sfrstart 42% 41% 39% 37% 36%
ndpintat 27% 27% 28% 29% 30%
caselddt 36% 38% 40% 41% 42%
Table A.24 New Deal Partner average per cent of time employed for selected 
 start dates of participation, for periods between three and 24 months 
 after participation
Months since programme start
Start variable 3 6 12 18 24
sfrstart 42% 42% 41% 40% 39%
ndpintat 27% 27% 27% 28% 28%
caselddt 33% 35% 37% 38% 39%
Appendices – Benefit duration, employment duration and wages results by programme
89
Table A.25 New Deal Partner mean annual taxable wages (£)
Year
Subgroup 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (May)
All cases 15,884 8,499 6,266 8,458 9,793 9,731
White 15,977 8,530 6,311 8,507 9,820 9,746
Black 16,380 7,755 5,356 7,281 8,726 8,862
Asian 14,154 8,117 5,769 7,747 9,250 9,522
NDYP
Table A.26 New Deal Young People benefit receipt rates for selected start  




Months since programme start




rt All cases 46% 33% 36% 32% 27%
With hard skills 58% 37% 46% 42% 35%
With subsidised employment 66% 38% 47% 40% 34%
gw
st
d All cases 45% 33% 37% 32% 28%
With hard skills 53% 35% 47% 41% 35%
With subsidised employment 61% 36% 47% 39% 34%
op
st
1 All cases 45% 33% 37% 32% 28%
With hard skills 53% 35% 47% 41% 35%
With subsidised employment 61% 36% 47% 39% 34%
Table A.27 New Deal Young People average per cent of time on benefit for  
 selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
 24 months after participation
Start 
variable
Months since programme start




rt All cases 56% 45% 38% 35% 37%
With hard skills 70% 58% 49% 48% 45%
With subsidised employment 76% 63% 53% 50% 37%
gw
st
d All cases 59% 48% 42% 40% 37%
With hard skills 66% 54% 47% 47% 44%
With subsidised employment 72% 59% 51% 49% 46%
op
st
1 All cases 59% 48% 42% 40% 37%
With hard skills 66% 54% 47% 47% 44%
With subsidised employment 72% 59% 51% 49% 46%
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Table A.28 New Deal Young People per cent employed for selected start dates of  
 participation, for periods between three and 24 months after participation 
Start 
variable
Months since programme start




rt All cases 29% 32% 34% 36% 38%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%




All cases 26% 28% 30% 32% 33%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%




All cases 26% 28% 30% 32% 33%
With hard skills 16% 19% 21% 22% 24%
With subsidised employment 23% 28% 32% 35% 37%
Table A.29 New Deal Young People average per cent of time employed for  
 selected start dates of participation, for periods between three and  
 24 months after participation
Start 
variable
Months since programme start




rt All cases 26% 29% 32% 33% 35%
With hard skills 20% 21% 23% 25% 27%
With subsidised employment 22% 23% 27% 29% 31%
gw
st
d All cases 23% 26% 28% 29% 30%
With hard skills 20% 21% 24% 26% 28%
With subsidised employment 22% 24% 28% 30% 32%
op
st
1 All cases 23% 26% 28% 29% 30%
With hard skills 20% 21% 24% 26% 28%
With subsidised employment 22% 24% 28% 30% 32%
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Table A.30 New Deal Young People mean annual taxable wages (£)
Year
Subgroup Type of option 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (May)




ll With hard skills 5,790 3,839 2,750 4,733 6,780 7,575







Missing 7,314 4,324 3,775 6,809 8,791 9,225
White 7,266 4,305 3,717 6,711 8,323 8,865
Black 6,207 4,033 3,527 6,195 7,506 8,447
Asian 6,939 4,061 3,556 7,087 8,894 9,951









Unknown 9,250 6,649 7,224 8,893 10,537 11,269
Single 7,563 4,370 4,036 7,105 8,634 9,289
Married 7,049 4,215 3,659 6,669 8,307 8,927
Widowed 10,663 5,777 4,271 7,259 8,951 8,701
Divorced Not enough observations
Separated 6,829 4,908 4,170 4,675 7,771 6,866
Cohabiting 8,313 4,794 3,256 6,021 6,980 7,989
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Appendix B 
Source data tables 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendices – Source data tables
100
Appendix C 
Quantile treatment effects 
This section discusses how the quantile treatment effects can be produced econometrically. 
Empirical strategies for quantile treatment effects
A quantile treatment effect can be regarded as the difference across the treatment status in two 
outcome quantiles (Bitler et al., 2003: 16). In the absence of problems of selection bias, such as in 
an ideal experimental allocation of treatment and control group, the 50 per cent quantile effect (the 
median or quantile treatment effect of the .5 quantile) would be defined as the sample median of 
the treatment group subtracted from the sample median of the control group. Other quantile effects 
can be estimated accordingly (ibid.). It is important to note that a causal model can only estimate 
the quantile treatment effects, but it will not be able to estimate quantiles of the treatment effect 
distribution (ibid.). 
In the absence of ideal experimental data51, we have the problem that we can only observe the 
outcome for programme participants and non-participants. Since the programme participants 
differ in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics from the non-participants, a simple 
comparison of particular distributional outcomes between both groups does not represent an 
unbiased estimate of the programme effect on the particular part of the distribution. 
Just as non-experimental evaluation studies estimate the mean effect of a programme on a 
particular group of participants, the evaluation of outcomes for particular parts of the distribution 
has to estimate a non-programme outcome for the participants. The distribution of the 
counterfactual control outcome can never be observed for the treatment group. 
Conditional Independence Assumption
The first strand of methods applied in order to estimate the distribution of the non-treatment 
outcome is based on a Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). This implies that one can 
estimate the outcome without participation irrespective of whether persons were actually 
participants or non-participants as long as non-participants are similar to the participants with 
respect to observable characteristics. 
This assumption is only plausible if data are informative and allow the observation of characteristics 
that affect both the decision to participate and the outcomes. If satisfied, a group of non-
participants similar in characteristics allows estimation of the distribution of the non-participation 
outcome for the participants. 
A huge disadvantage for the CIA is the ‘curse-of-dimensionality’, as it might be difficult to find 
similar non-participants with respect to a large set of observable characteristics. Therefore, 
most evaluation studies use the result by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that the CIA also holds 
with respect to the probability of treatment (‘propensity score’) as a function of all observable 
characteristics.
51 In practice, most experimental data will require the non-experimental estimation methods.
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In empirical applications for welfare-to-work programmes in the USA, Bitler et al., 2003 propose 
to implement an inverse propensity score weighting of quantile regressions. Similarly, Firpo 
(2007) proposes a framework of estimating quantile treatment effects based on a Conditional 
Independence Assumption. He implements a weight by the inverse of a nonparametric estimate of 
the propensity score. This was first implemented by Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003) for Average 
Treatment Effects, who show that the procedure can leads to an efficient estimate of the average 
treatment effect.
Implementing propensity score weighting would be a feasible strategy in order to estimate the 
effect of the British welfare-to-work policies on particular parts of the distribution, e.g. on the very 
short and very long durations of unemployment as there are often informative survey data available 
that have been used for earlier evaluation studies implementing propensity score matching (e.g. the 
econometric evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents by De Azevedo, Dolton and Smith 2006). 
These can provide the very wide set of characteristics that are used in estimation to satisfy the 
credibility of the CIA.
Instruments
A second means of estimating quantile treatment effects by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) 
extends the non-experimental framework established in Heckman and Robb (1986). As for the 
models implementing an inverse propensity score weighting, this paper first makes an identifying 
assumption how a particular policy can affect features of the distribution of potential outcomes, 
e.g. the quantiles of potential outcomes under various treatments, conditional on observed 
characteristics. This particular distributional outcome is denoted as the ‘quantile treatment response 
function’, and the quantile treatment effect summarises the differences in the impact of treatments 
on the quantiles of potential outcomes. By integrating over the various quantile effects, the average 
effects can be defined. 
The problem of estimating either one of these is again the difference in observable characteristics 
between participants and non-participants inducing selection bias, so that conventional quantile 
regressions of observed outcomes are inappropriate for measuring the impact and estimating the 
quantile treatment effect. 
To solve this, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) propose estimating quantile treatment effects using 
instruments, which are variables that affect the participation in the particular programme, but which 
are independent of potential outcomes. 
One may think of instruments as representing some unobserved characteristics about participants 
and non-participants, e.g. ability, and can control for that unobserved information which can affect 
outcomes and be correlated with participation. Such an instrument is interesting for describing and 
learning the structure of differing treatment effects and controlling for unobserved information 
about participants. They present an example of an instrumented analysis of the returns to schooling, 
where they treat schooling as endogenous to the wage outcome, and the instrument (weak) is the 
variation in the geographic measure of proximity to the school which proxies for years of education 
in a quantile regression of wages on education, which they used to uncover the variation in the 
returns to schooling. 
The estimation of quantile treatment effects assumes that, given informative characteristics as 
covariates, an instrument exists which is related to participation in the programme, but not to 
outcomes. In other words, this crucially depends on the availability of instruments, which can reflect 
exogenous variation affecting programme participation (e.g. the distance to the job centre or being 
part of a programme pilot) or ultimately the random assignment status in a controlled experiment. 
Finding measured data items which can act as instruments is not straightforward. 
Appendices – Quantile treatment effects
102
Similarly, Froelich and Melly (2008) assume the availability of instruments as a potential strategy 
for estimating quantile treatment effects. However, in this case, the instrumental variable may 
only really affect a narrow group of all participants in their potential outcomes and potential 
treatment status, and not the entire distribution. As Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005), they assume 
independence given available instruments, but only close to a threshold affecting the participation 
status. The resulting quantile treatment effect would only be an effect for participants (and non-
participants) close to such a threshold (a ‘local’ treatment effect), extending the concept of Imbens 
and Agrist (1994) to quantile treatment effects. Note that this means that the impact is then limited in 
interpretation. 
Quantiles of the treatment effect?
While quantile treatment effects can be identified, quantiles of the treatment effects are another 
item and these cannot be identified without further knowledge or assumptions about the joint 
distribution. The following two assumptions exist in real-world studies on the identification of the 
quantiles of the treatment effect:
1 A distribution fully identified by the mean impact: Bitler et al. (2003) refer to an example how 
the treatment effects are recovered. An assumption could be that the treatment effects is equal 
for all observations and fully identified by the mean impact, i.e. the cumulative distribution of 
treatment effects is fully characterised by a mean and supports only that one value. This is very 
unlikely for a real-world distribution of unemployment duration, for example.
2 Rank preservation: Any person whose outcome in the counterfactual control distribution is the 
qth quantile will also have an outcome that is the qth quantile in the counterfactual treatment 
distribution. Then, the quantile treatment effect is the quantile of the treatment effect (see Bitler 
et al., 2003: 17). 
Since the quantile treatment effect is always identified by the difference of marginals at quantile 
q, it follows that cumulative distribution of treatment effects is also identified by sorting the set 
of estimated differences. However this sorting may allow the rank preservation to hold for a large 
proportion of the distribution, but there are parts like the bottom of the distribution where the 
rank preservation fails. Quantile treatment effects can be seen as differences in the treated and 
comparison distribution, not the treatment effects for identifiable persons in either distribution. 
In the case where rank preservation fails, there are still important features of the joint distribution 
which can be identified, like the mean treatment effect, see Bitler et al. (2003) for details. If this is 
the objective of interest, the marginal distributions are just as informative as the joint distribution. 
Even with heterogeneous effects some important features of the joint distribution can be identified, 
depending on the estimated quantile treatment effects.
They find there are a number of results that hold: 
1 For any particular quantile, the minimum treatment effect is no larger than the smallest quantile 
treatment effect. If we find a negative quantile treatment effect, at least one treatment effect 
must also be negative.
2 The same holds for negative treatment effects: If any quantile treatment effect is positive, at 
least one treatment effect must also be positive.
3 The variance of the distribution of treatment effects is at least as great as the variance of the 
quantile treatment effects.
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If subgroups are defined with respect to characteristics that are either permanent or fixed over  
the period of study, the above results hold within subgroups, which may yield further information 
(for example, the maximum quantile treatment effect may be greater in a subgroup than in the 
pooled sample).
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Appendix D 
Information regarding DWP 
datasets
(Supplied by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) November 2008, sourced from the DWP 
intranet.)
Programme databases
New Deal 50 plus 
New Deal 50 plus (ND50+) is a voluntary programme where customers aged 50 and over can receive 
specialist advice in assisting them back into work.
New Deal for Disabled People
New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) offers support to help people with health conditions and 
disabilities to find and keep jobs. NDDP is voluntary and offers eligible people access to a network 
of Job Brokers from private, voluntary and public sector organisations. A number of datasets are 
derived from the NDDP data:
•	 NDDP	Registrants	–	This	dataset	includes	all	clients	who	volunteer	for	NDDP.	
•	 NDDP	Referrals	(to	Job	Brokers)	–	Includes	the	details	of	customers	Jobcentre	Plus	have	referred	
to Job Brokers in order to match with registrants to evaluate take-up rates. The data is used in the 
evaluation of NDDP and in the production of National Statistics. 
•	 NDDP	LABOUR	MARKET	SYSTEM	(LMS)	Jobs	–	Includes	details	of	NDDP	customers	who	have	a	job	
outcome recorded on the Jobcentre Plus benefit system. 
•	 NDDP	Eligible	Population.	This	extract	is	used	to	identify	all	customers	who	are	eligible	for	a	NDDP	
Gateway interview, who are then contacted. 
New Deal for Lone Parents
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) aims to help lone parents to overcome barriers into work and 
improve their job readiness. NDLP was introduced as a voluntary programme nationally in October 
1998 for those lone parents claiming Income Support (IS). It was extended in November 2001 for all 
lone parents who are not working or who are working less than 16 hours per week.
New Deal for Long Term Unemployed
New Deal for Long Term Unemployed (NDLTU) was introduced nationally on 29 June 1998 for those 
who had been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least two years. From April 2001, NDLTU 
was extended and enhanced to provide clients with access to a greater and more tailored range of 
support and provision. Eligibility has been extended to include those who had been claiming JSA for 
18 months or more.
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New Deal for Partners
New Deal for Partners (NDP) was re-launched in April 2004. The programme offers non-working 
partners of working-age persons claiming JSA (excluding Joint Claims couples), IS, Incapacity Benefit 
(IB), Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) or Carer’s Allowance (CA) a similar level of help and 
support currently available to lone partners through the NDLP programme. This dataset contains all 
partners that have gone through the NDP programme.
New Deal for Young People
New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was introduced nationally on 6 April 1998 and is aimed at those 
aged 18-24 who have been claiming JSA for at least six months. Eligible clients will progress through 
a Gateway period, lasting up to four months, where advisers will work to improve employability and 
to find unsubsidised jobs for as many as possible. Those who do not find a job will move into one 
of four options: Subsidised employment, Full-time education/training, Environmental Task Force, 
or Voluntary Sector jobs. Clients’ reaching the end of their option without obtaining a job enter a 
follow-through period, where they receive intensive help to find a job.
The Master Index
The Master Index is an individual-level spells database that brings together the historical 
programme evaluation databases from the Employment Service and the 100 per cent National 
Benefit Databases (NBD), previously known as the Working Age Statistical Database (WASD). It 
aims to provide, for the first time, easy cross benefit and programme analysis. The Master Index is 
the primary DWP feed for the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) and the Job Outcome 
Target (JOT) data.
The Master Index covers the main New Deal programmes and further programmes, pilots and 
pathfinders. The dataset also contains ten benefits taken from NBD and also JOT spells data. 
The main variables are a unique identifier (ORCID), start and end dates of spells and the benefit/
programme type for that period. 
Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
From January 2004, the WPLS links benefit and programme information held by DWP on its customers, 
with employment records from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). New data-sharing 
provisions introduced in the Employment Act 2002 have opened the way for DWP to receive more data 
on employment from HMRC and use the information for more purposes. DWP and HMRC have been 
working together to enable this data sharing to take place and to develop safeguards for the initiative.
The P14 and P45 data dictionaries contain details of the variables for each dataset, plus frequency 
counts of the decode values for each variable. 
The 100 per cent National Benefit Databases
Formerly known as the WASD. These databases were created to evaluate the impact the 
introduction of Jobcentre Plus offices had on the Labour Market. The series of databases contain 
information about clients’ claims and spells on the main DWP benefits from June 1999 and is 
updated every month. The data comes from the different benefits systems and covers the following 
benefits – JSA, IS, IB, SDA, ICA (CA), PIB, Widows Benefit (WB)/Bereavement Benefit (BB), Disability 
Living Allowance, Pension Credit, Retirement Pension, and Attendance Allowance.
•	 The	‘National Database’ datasets holds claim-level information on what benefits a person has 
claimed (Great Britain only).
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•	 The	‘Spells Database’ holds a record for each spell someone has had on benefit (i.e. one or more 
consecutive benefit claims).
•	 The	‘Client Group History Table’ contains a complete history of which client groups a person has 
belonged to during their time on benefit. The datasets also records what their previous and next 
client group was.
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